



**‘The Political Economy of Non-Recurrence:
Navigating National Healing, Institutional Reform & Militarisation in
Zimbabwe’**

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NDLMAN014

Thesis Presented for the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (MPHIL) IN JUSTICE & TRANSFORMATION

In the Department of Political Studies

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

Monday 10 February 2020

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This thesis is dedicated to my fellow Zimbabwean youth. As we struggle for a better future, I hope that this study helps us analyse the complexities of holding our politicians accountable and of achieving social cohesion. Furthermore, I hope it grants us a deeper understanding of the systemic Goliath we are facing and assists us in improving our strategies of research, policy development and practice for the betterment of our country.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To my dear parents, thank you for supporting me through what seemed like “the never-ending thesis”. Your understanding and patience towards me have been immensely endearing. I would need another thesis to express the inspiration I have drawn from both your journeys in my research – thank you. To my older sister, Dr Nompilo Ndlovu, your research and mind continue to inspire me. Thank you for allowing me to talk through my thoughts and for being a constant friend throughout this journey. I am privileged to have you in my corner. To my little sister, thank you for providing comic relief and encouragement when the journey got tough. I hope I continue to inspire you to be the best version of yourself. The four of you often came to the rescue when my health, and narrative clarity evaded me, and were so gracious with my frustration when events in Zimbabwe overtook this project. Also, to Dr Kudrat Virk, your edits and ‘corruptions’ were highly appreciated.

Finally, to Dr Helen Scanlon – my supervisor, mentor, and the real reason I found the strength to complete this project – thank you for all your mentorship and guidance since 2014. As my supervisor, you have been a pillar of invaluable support throughout this MPhil journey. I am forever indebted to you for teaching me about humane justice approaches, as well as the importance of narrating my own story from all the positions I occupy in society. You have always believed in, and supported me and for that, I am eternally grateful for your presence in my life.

ABSTRACT

The thesis contextualises the state of transitional justice, elite outlooks and militarisation in Zimbabwe, whilst drawing attention to the complexities of achieving this reality. The study draws from transitional justice, civil-military relations, as well as the political settlements literature as analytical frameworks.

Essentially, the study poses two key questions: How does studying transitional justice and elite culture help pre-plan for strategies to professionalise the military and reallocate civic-political duties to citizens should Zimbabwe transition out of authoritarianism? Once achieved, how can this be sustained towards socio-economic development?

The study also tackles questions of justice and impunity whilst framing client-patron relations amongst the elite as impediments to progress. Amidst cyclical episodes of violation, the thesis links the denial of justice through amnesties, corruption, and further violence, to the politics of policing memory and trauma. This is analysed within the scope of the late Robert Mugabe regime as well as the current Emmerson Mnangagwa regime – both of which are inherited legacies from the Ian Smith regime. The intricacies of elite networks and accumulation are then laid out, culminating in deliberations on how to navigate prospects for reform, in understanding the politics of non-recurrence when contextualising systemic as well as physical violence. The thesis aims to contribute to ongoing discussions on political leadership, national healing, and institutional reform in Zimbabwe.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|---------|---|
| AFZ | Air Force of Zimbabwe |
| AIPPA | Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act |
| AU | African Union |
| AUTJP | African Union Transitional Justice Policy |
| CCJP | Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace |
| CIO | Central Intelligence Organisation |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| ESAP | Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes |
| G-40 | Generation 40 (ZANU-PF) |
| GNU | Government of National Unity |
| GPA | Global Political Agreement |
| JOC | Joint Operations Command |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| LOMA | Law and Order Maintenance Act |
| MDC | Movement for Democratic Change |
| MDC-T | Movement for Democratic Change (Tsvangirai faction) |
| MOPA | Maintenance of Peace and Order Act |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| NPRC | National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (Zimbabwe) |
| NTJWG | National Transitional Justice Working Group of Zimbabwe |
| ONHRI | Organ of National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration |
| OSLEG | Operation Sovereign Legitimacy |
| PF-ZAPU | Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union |

| | |
|---------|---|
| POSA | Public Order and Security Act |
| SADC | Southern Africa Development Community |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| SOEs | State-Owned Enterprises |
| SST | Security Sector Transformation |
| RAU | Research and Advocacy Unit |
| RF | Rhodesian Front |
| TJ | Transitional Justice |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| ZANU | Zimbabwe African National Union |
| ZANU-PF | Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front |
| ZANLA | Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army |
| ZAPU | Zimbabwe African People's Union |
| ZBC | Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation |
| ZDF | Zimbabwe Defence Force |
| ZEC | Zimbabwe Electoral Commission |
| ZIMSTAT | Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency |
| ZIPRA | Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army |
| ZNLWVA | Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association |
| ZPS | Zimbabwe Prison Services |
| ZRP | Zimbabwe Republic Police |
| ZMDC | Zimbabwe Mining and Development Corporation |
| ZNA | Zimbabwe National Army |
| ZUM | Zimbabwe Unity Movement |

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*... even in a post-Mugabe era there will be “tremendous problems to overcome”, needing a
“hard headed notion of progress, rooted in painful and complex realities”*

– Hoffman, 2012, in Moore, 2012: 2

CHAPTER I

Contextualising the argument

Militarisation has been inherent in elitist legitimacies in Zimbabwe. The configuration of bargaining elites was, however, always intended to create a hegemony of the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) had served as a threat to the existence of both ZANU-PF and the benefits that came to those aligned to it since Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) had split from ZAPU on 8 August 1963 (Sithole, 1988:254). Former President Robert Mugabe knew that “tolerating a partner in government will be costly because each [alliance] will almost certainly pursue very different if not competing policies” (Walter, 1999:137-8). The foundations of which were laid through tokenised political settlements seen from the 1978 Internal Settlement until the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement which facilitated Zimbabwe’s independence. Mugabe’s continued intolerance of opposition is seen in the cyclical legacy of violence where ZANU-PF deemed Patriotic Front–Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU) and all other opposition “enemies of the state” and worked to systemically dislodge their power (Bratton, 2016:55). Under Mugabe, ZANU-PF came to gain control by dominating political and economic institutions in Zimbabwe (Makumbe, 2003, in Bratton, 2016:61; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008). This method of survival continues to be used, in 2019, by the ruling party under President Emmerson Mnangagwa (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758).

Zimbabwean political culture, as inherited from Rhodesia, performs politics within the suppression of truths that criticises those in power and their allies (Bratton, 2016; Kriger, 2012). Though this and its implications will be further discussed in Chapters III (1) and IV (3) of the thesis, it is important to understand that this is the environment in which Transitional Justice (TJ) operates in Zimbabwe. From negotiations towards the independence settlement in 1980, Zimbabwe made “no concerted formalised attempt to allow truth telling [nor] to promote reconciliation between the three warring parties – ZANU-PF, PF-ZAPU and the Rhodesians” (Eppel, 2006:262). Likewise, prioritising narratives that recognised, and continue to acknowledge, some instances of violence over others is politically shrewd yet distinctively problematic (Eppel, 2013:212-3). Bratton

(2016:52), with the benefit of hindsight, notes that “the independence settlement deferred [fundamental problems] that would later come back to haunt the country”. One can witness the manifestation of his sentiments through the nature of ZANU-PF clientelism and the militarised conditions for its survival and accumulation (Alexander, 2013; Moore, 2012; Kriger, 2012).

Considering past, and recent episodes, of organised violence, torture, and abduction of Zimbabwean citizens, national conversations around perpetration, healing, and justice need to occur. In this, TJ efforts, which work to foster an environment for non-recurrence of violation, are pivotal. However, until past and future TJ efforts in Zimbabwe recognise the nature of political settlements in the country, attempts at institutional reform will likely prove futile (Bratton, 2016:228). That said, redressing human rights abuses requires nuanced engagements with intersecting approaches to people and communities (Mani, 2005). Efforts at national healing must then be understood within the need to navigate Zimbabwe’s power politics in this thesis. Analyses in this thesis are focused on institutional post-2008 efforts due to the timeframe in which institutional reform was prioritised as a thematic area within the country’s TJ conversation. This does not take away from cumulative efforts of various stakeholders dating further than the ‘Civil Society and Justice Symposium in Zimbabwe’ in August 2003, notable for its formative conversation regarding the National Transitional Justice Working Group of Zimbabwe (NTJWG) (Eppel, 2006; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2014:1-3).

The thesis investigates the state of TJ and militarisation in Zimbabwe whilst revisiting conversations that promote calls for guarantees of non-recurrence, the re-professionalisation of the military and conducive environment outside the patronage-based economy for inclusive institutions. The thesis elaborates on the linkages pertaining to the politics of delivering the guarantees of non-recurrence whilst militarised elites remain in power. Furthermore, it highlights possible in-roads and challenges to transforming institutions within patronage economies. In doing this, connections to institutions, political leadership and the military are underscored throughout the thesis through political settlements analyses and reference to ‘securocrats’ (Alexander, 2013; Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005; Eppel, 2013; ICG, 2010). Here, securocrats are defined as nationally high-ranking military service chiefs who navigate state politics as the elite in governance, public resource generation, business and electoral spaces for personal benefits that necessitate their

survival (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758; ICG, 2010:11-3; Tendi, 2013:837). The thesis analyses post-liberation settlements from the Unity Accord of 1987 as first political settlement in independent Zimbabwe. Though the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement which brought about Zimbabwe's independence from the 1978 Internal Settlement that had resulted in the hybrid state of 'Zimbabwe-Rhodesia' are noted; they remain pertinent to the legacy rather than the content scope of this thesis (Bratton, 2016:46-7).

Following what Eppel (2009b:1) refers to as “the worst state violence since the Gukurahundi massacres of the 1980s”, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) between the ruling ZANU-PF, with Robert Mugabe as President, and the two opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) factions, with Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister and Arthur Mutambara and Thokozani Khupe as Deputy Prime Ministers, was formed (Mutisi, 2011). This settlement mandated the Government of National Unity (GNU) which ran from 2009-2013. The electoral violence and “torture of 2008 [had] denied Tsvangirai electoral victory, and simultaneously denied Mugabe legitimacy” (Eppel, 2013:211). Moore (2012:1-2) notes this form of election outcome – in “the thinnest [display] of democracy” – as a still-born transitional inclusive government. Yet, it can be argued that the most significant national effort towards transitional justice in contemporary Zimbabwean history came out of this political settlement. A key result of the MDC joining government was the inclusion of justice and reconciliation initiatives on the executive political agenda (Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:81). However, as will be shown, the political culture in Zimbabwe then, as it is in 2019, does not allow for effective engagement with such initiatives (Eppel, 2009b:2–3).

The thesis updates the status of historical impediments to accessing retributive and distributive justice in Zimbabwe in the Mnangagwa regime as at 2019. The study does so by outlining links through political leadership and the military; networks of accumulation; cycles of violence; trauma and denialism; as well as calls and responses to justice by citizens and the government. All which feed into each other to maintain the status quo. Historically, the technical approach within TJ has prioritised civil-political rights where efforts to confronting the effects of physical violence supersede those of structural violence and a lack of social cohesion (Gready & Robins, 2014:342; Nesiah, 2016:5,27). As Nesiah (2016:27) notes, identifying the ‘structural’ helps in rethinking

justice delivery “as a pre-packaged menu”. Long term impact requires a more nuanced relationship that identifies ‘holistic’ interventions premised on “the interrelationship between many domains of justice struggles” that make TJ relevant to the broader context in which it operates (Nesiah, 2016:27). Likewise, it is important to appreciate institutions as tools, rather than aspirational goals, in achieving non-recurrence. The technical push towards the latter in Zimbabwe has consistently recreated “institutional fetishism” that has been co-opted by the ruling elites to suit their own interests (Nesiah, 2016:27). Elites often concede to institutional capacity building after ruptural episodes of violence as they recognise the need to consolidate their legitimacy within the narratives of functional ‘stateliness’ rather than heal society. Left unaddressed, “the absence of functioning centralised state institutions” renders countries failed states - a “byword for lawlessness” – which can be problematic to cementing legitimacy derived from the appearance of social cohesion from existing institutions (McEvoy, 2007:422).

McEvoy (2007:423) notes that though developing a state’s institutional capacity is fundamental to rebuilding structures of governance, the rigid blueprint provided by traditional TJ interventions can act as a tool to further entrench anti-developmental elite interests. This highlights TJ as a state rather than a civic initiative. In Zimbabwe, this is done by enacting replicable institutional capacity enhancement to strengthen extractive elite interests or creating institutions for healing without intentional sincerity for change (Mnangagwa, 2018, in Tarusarira, 2019: 210). More than legalistic replications, the *sine qua non* precondition to reconstruction is a receptive political environment (McEvoy, 2007:423). Though this is pivotal, governments feigning collaboration in transition may also adopt the same approaches to consolidate their legitimisation (Mihir, 2013). To this end, the thesis argues for multidimensional engagements to the transformation project which must navigate elite interests to deliver social cohesion, institutional reform and thwart legacies of pervasive militarism (Khan, 2010; Mihir, 2013: 304-11).

Significance of the Study

The continued militarisation of the Zimbabwean state remains concerning for the socio-economic stability of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region as well as sustainable social protections of Zimbabwean citizens in the country. Security Sector Reform (SSR) holds the

key to the development of the state. The conduct of the current Mnangagwa regime since 2017, like that of its predecessors, underscores the need for such reform. This thesis is, thus, timely and examines existing conversations on and around SSR in Zimbabwe, while exploring ways to nuance them. SSR, as in the case of militarisation, must be viewed as politicised within the tenets of governance (Brinkerhoff, 2005:9–11; Hutchful, 2000, in Ball et al., 2003:268; Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005:359). As Ball, Fayemi, Olonisakin, Williams, and Rupiya (2003) write:

[o]ne of the major impediments to security sector reform and transformation in Africa has been the unwillingness of heads of state and government to accept the need for improvements in security-sector governance. A major reason for that unwillingness has been the dependency of these leaders on the security forces for their positions of power, and hence their economic well-being. (p. 294)

As an application of the political settlements framework will show in this thesis, this has exacerbated civil-military relations in Zimbabwe and inhibited reform (Bratton, 2016:228). In so doing, the thesis further seeks to re-emphasise the positionality of securitised elites (securocrats) in perpetuating legacies of flawed institutional management, social cohesion, and development (Amoako, 2001, in Ball et al., 2003:264). The literature on political settlements is also useful in buttressing TJ-aligned understandings of the legacies of failed state reconstruction in Zimbabwe (McEvoy, 2007:421-4; Nesiah, 2016). Political settlements analysis can further help to decode the power politics that have shaped the country's trajectory since independence.

In confronting the political challenges of restructuring the security sector in present-day Zimbabwe, the thesis is aware that any single theoretical typology alone cannot be burdened with interrogating prospects for transforming civil-military relations in 2019. It, therefore, argues for multi-dimensional approaches in the search for solutions.

Given Zimbabwe's cyclical episodes of state securitisation, and the crucial importance of its stability for wider regional stability, the country presents as a complex case study that underscores the multifaceted nature of the security sector, while highlighting those institutional and elite facets that enable the sector's divisive effects on the implementation of human security objectives (Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12). Likewise, systemic legacies formed during transitional periods, which either disrupt or entrench cultures that nurse widespread political grievances, are

considered. These include, among others, the insulation of elite power, militarised hierarchies, and the silencing of dissent (both civic and political) as a perceived threat. In this regard, the thesis also interrogates the need to politicise future transitional processes. This is necessary to reviewing institutions towards sustainable, peaceful reform rather than have them as a goal of such reform (McEvoy, 2007: 421-3; Nesiah, 2016:27). Closing of the democratised space has long been a reason why justice processes sought by civil society lack political support (Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:77). There is a need, thus, to explore the legacy of exclusionary patron-client relations that have led to such cyclical closures. Any recommendations must also consider the prospects for inclusive development in a securitised state.

The re-securitisation of the Zimbabwean state in the aftermath of Operation Restore Legacy – the 2017 coup that ousted Mugabe from power – has increased the need to revisit SSR strategies noted by scholars, national organs as well as civic organisations in the search for holistic justice, inclusive development, and civic rights. New security sector governance challenges, which make use of political settlement frameworks to maximise elite interests and weaken prospects for TJ processes, remain a problem. Furthermore, an interrogation of the prospects for victims, who continue to be led by commanders of perpetrators, remains a valid exercise, as a research contribution towards sharpening both policy and civic interventions towards SSR and TJ.

Method, Methodology, Ethics and Limitations

This thesis uses a qualitative research methodology. In choosing not to include quantitative methods, I have been guided by a feminist approach to research. This approach speaks to the need to abandon positivism, which emphasises objectified knowledge as scientifically produced in the social sciences. Hence, this thesis' acceptance of inherent, humanistic subjective interpretations – based on my standpoint during the research – is itself a contribution to the literature (Bhavnani, 1994; Collins, 1990). The research method used to conduct this study consisted of reviewing secondary sources such as journal articles, books chapters, newspaper articles, and speeches – ranging from narratives by statesmen, to works by academics with varying ideologies and by technocrats from the Northern and Southern hemispheres alike.

All ethical considerations were noted. However, the thesis has discernible limitations. Victims of the militarised dynamics in Zimbabwe cut across epochs, class, age, and ethnicity. Yet, interviews were not conducted. First, given heightened securitisation and uncertainty in the state, conducting interviews was not astute – both in terms of physical safety and in terms of generating a resurgence of the trauma associated with retelling past instances of violence, without offering proper counselling to deal with it. Second, the aim was to explore which rectificatory needs are pressing in 2019. Interviews, though, may be considered at a later stage in any further investigation.

CHAPTER II

1. Detached Conversations: Contextualising Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe

In April 2009, Article 7 of the GPA established the Organ of National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) as part of its 100-day plan. This organ was mandated to what “might” be necessary for its perceptions of “national healing” and “reconciliation” without a direct action towards the exploration of truth and justice (Eppel, 2013:211-4; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:10). Two key tenets of transitional justice were therefore invalidated before it began. In retrospect, the ONHRI was set up to unravel itself. The organ had neither an operational nor targeted advisory role. As Thomson and Jazdowska (2012:84) note, it operated within “a political and legal vacuum”. The ambiguousness of the clauses that mandated it towards national healing misconstrued the organ as a blueprint for implementation, when it was not (Bratton, 2016:221; Eppel, 2013:211-2). Rather, it was an advisory body that informed “what should be done, and not, as is sometimes claimed, to actually implement a process of national healing” (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:4). Further testament to the view of the organ was that it was formed several months after the 2008 political settlement and it was managed by bureaucratic state security agents.

The ONHRI had three ministers in charge however they did not attend cabinet as they headed up an organ and not a ministry. These ministers inherited no enabling legislation, no budget, no staff and no bureaucratic framework. The reluctance for reform was also reflective in how the bureaucratic work was done by Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) staff from the office of the president (Bratton, 2016:221-2; Eppel, 2013:212; Ndlovu, 2019:14). The clauses that formed the organ bound parties to what “might” be needed to redress past violence and perpetration rather than what is tangible (Eppel, 2013:212). As Bratton (2016:221) notes, “the organ never established itself as a credible instrument for alleviating political violence”. This is buttressed, possibly unknowingly, by former Minister of State in the President's Office, and Co-Chair of the ONHRI at the time, John Landa Nkomo’s lauding of the “Zimbabwean project and program run by Zimbabweans...to immediately stop violence” (Bratton, 2016:221). Alas, one cannot stop violence that is cyclical and endemic without a commitment to redress and truth-telling (Nesiah, 2016:27-8; Tarusarira, 2019:209-13). Nkomo, who later became Vice President of the country, illustrated

how wrong the perceptions of the function and durability of the organ were at the time among senior government officials.

Concerns were raised about the political culture, replicated with the GNU, which consolidated political settlements within the elite (ICG, 2010:3-4). The exclusion of civil society removed the leveraging factor towards pushing for reforms that would benefit citizens rather than bargaining elites (Mani, 2008:255; Mutisi, 2011:4; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:32; Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:88). The structure of the GPA was also dictated by Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The failures of the MDC to make tactful use of their two-thirds majority in parliament cost civil-society traction in realising legal reforms that would have weakened the president's executive power. Specifically, the GPA could have included, for example, the authority to challenge the presidential powers which saw Mugabe appoint both the Attorney-General and the Reserve Bank Governor without consulting Tsvangirai, as mandated by the agreement itself (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:4-6). Despite the MDC's two-thirds majority in parliament, Constitutional Commissioners who are selected by a parliamentary committee were all ZANU-PF-aligned, "none of whom had any reputable democratic credentials" (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:6). According to Kriger (2012:13), speculation persists that MDC elites were co-opted into ZANU-PF patron-client networks and forgot the role that they had to play in facilitating justice and democratisation. The demands for ZANU-PF's survival were based on "the closure of democratic space" (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:6). As will be discussed in Chapter IV (1), patronage economies remain exclusionary in this way.

In highlighting the tokenisation of TJ initiatives at the time, the ONHRI ministers themselves described the agreement as "a document of political compromise and has left unresolved issues which undermine their power to act" (Eppel, 2013:214; Bratton, 2016:227-8; Matyszak & Reeler, 2011). Likewise, civil-military engagement was not adequately addressed during the GPA negotiations (ICG, 2010: 4). The lack of SSR in Zimbabwe resulted in the entrenched influence of securocrats as "the bedrock for ZANU-PF in political governance" (Mutisi, 2011: 4). Meanwhile, the ONHRI further revealed its position regarding the narrative for justice and transformation when Minister Moses Mzila-Ndlovu was arrested in 2011, for attending a prayer service commemorating the victims of the Gukurahundi Massacres – whose violations will be elaborated on in Chapter III

(2). The organ was powerless in influencing change in the deteriorating security situation in the rural areas between 2010 and 2012 in the run up to elections (Bratton, 2016:221-2; Eppel, 2013:211). The security sector in 2019, as was in 2008, remains within ZANU-PF control and there remain no prospects for reform as many “[s]elective arrests for political violence and impunity for security sector perpetrators” still occur (Eppel, 2013:213). The ONHRI failed on delivering accountability towards healing but succeed in its ambiguous mandate on what was probable in theory rather than reality.

Further superficial provisions for transitional justice were signed into effect in the 22 May 2013 Constitutional Amendment. The ONHRI was dissolved in the same year, after Mugabe announced his new cabinet, which saw the creation of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) on 18 August 2013 under Sections 251, 252 and 253¹ of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013. Though there was no clear scope and a decade long tenure, Mugabe had seen the political benefits in calling for peace as seen in aforementioned interpretations of the need for ‘stateliness’ (Bratton, 2016:221; McEvoy, 2007:421-4). The ONHRI and the NPRC, established in 2014, may have well been created by ZANU-PF to be “pragmatic mechanism that can be gestured to whenever the issue of accountability is raised” (Eppel, 2013:214). In this, deterring progress in TJ for Zimbabwe as their decisions are centralised in executive authority. For Raftopoulos (2013a:972), “a reconstitution of the political terrain in Zimbabwe” was shown in ZANU-PF regaining power in 2013. The GNU had clearly not put an end to impunity despite 75% of the 2,400 adult Zimbabwean citizens who participated in the survey preferring prosecution of perpetrators of political violence by July 2012 (Afrobarometer, 2012, in Bratton, 2016:226).

Much of this violence took place at the intra community level, and took the form of neighbours against neighbours, or even of family members brutally attacking other members. Within ten weeks, appalling damage was done to the social fabric in rural villages across the nation. Almost every victim of this violence can name at least some of their perpetrators, as they are from their local ZANU PF and war vet structures, or are local youth forced into taking part in beating those known to be MDC activists or supporters (Eppel, 2009b:1).

Endemic violence remains transferrable in communities especially when it has not been dealt with (Mani, 2008:259-60). The result of the violence noted above was further violence inflicted through retaliatory violence or the continued freedom of perpetrators in society which further traumatised victims (Eppel, 2009b:1). The GPA repeated the mistakes of the 1987 Unity Accord as it was a political settlement that was brokered by elites pursuing their interests. The result of limited civil society engagement was an over-adherence to power sharing rather than redress of societal ills (Mutisi, 2011:4; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:31-3). This structure reinforced a ZANU-PF chain of command as the GPA “contained no method by which Articles relating to democratic reforms could be enforced” (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:6). Considering gestured peacebuilding processes, a failed GNU and a trust deficit in government-led initiatives, these provisions are a mockery to the promotion of peace and reconciliation in the country given the cancerous political culture that inhibits reform. Unsurprisingly, the NPRC has failed to affect tangible change on the ground (Eppel, 2013).

Current ambitions towards actual TJ in Zimbabwe are constrained by non-governmental actor efforts. To this end, the NTJWG which works as a parallel civic structure to the NPRC was established in 2014. Housed at the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and established by 46 non-state TJ stakeholders in Zimbabwe, the NTJWG continues to work with government and citizens to redress past wrongs. It does so with its focus on 6 thematic areas: Promotion of Truth; Justice and Accountability; Reparations and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence; Memorialisation; Gender and Institutional Reforms (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2014:1-3). Reflecting on the 2018 NTJWG Transitional Justice Policy Symposium Report, recommendations to “build strong institutions that act above party politics” shows a lack of understanding of endemic civil-military relations present in Zimbabwe (NTJWG, 2018:25). Such strategies for institutional reform and SSR render some recommendations presented as tokenistic at best. Likewise, recommendations for the NPRC to provide clauses that obligate governmental authorities to implement recommendations will not work whilst securocrats who are currently in power are implicated and national institutions such as the judiciary are under a captured security community (NTJWG, 2018:24). As Michael Bratton (2016:228) points out, “[a]s long as ZANU-PF’s coalition of civil-military elites remains the dominant power in the land, prospects for transitional justice in Zimbabwe are limited”. This has been seen in the lack of reform in the crossover from the Mugabe

regime to the Mnangagwa regime. Intricacies of this systemic recurrence will be expanded on in Chapter V of the thesis.

Additional recommendations for Zimbabwe to learn from best international practices and “draw lessons from other jurisdictions” bare imprudence given the legacy of limited political will in the country and the flawed AU transitional justice policies (NTJWG, 2018:24). Elaborating on the latter, Article 95 of the 2019 African Union Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP) which notes normative practices for successful and political institutional reform still makes limited reference to the urgent need for SSR in the work of post-conflict reconstruction on the continent. Additionally, in Article 41 of the 2013 African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform, “Heads of State and Government, members of Cabinet and other coordinating officials that assist the Executive in the execution of their functions, [continue to be mandated to] direct the security sector” (AUC, 2013:17; AUC, 2019:19; NTJWG, 2018:14, 24). This essential legitimisation of the personalisation of power by securocrats is seen through violations to be discussed in Chapter III (2) which the Mnangagwa regime notes as justifiable.

To illustrate a lack of political will from the executive, in 2018, five years into the supposed tenure of the NPRC, the government was yet to clearly establish the start and subsequent lifespan of the commission owing to parliamentary delays (Chitagu, 2019; NTJWG, 2018:13). Buttressing this, Justice Joseph Masufire noted Section 251 as “the most ambiguous provision in the Constitution” whilst presiding over the issue of the NPRC’s tenure in February 2019. Concillia Chinanzvavana of the MDC Alliance had challenged President Mnangagwa to extend the tenure of the NPRC in Masvingo’s High Court. Despite this, the call for retributive justice on the ground is strong. When questioned on attitudes towards TJ in 2018, 70% of the 2,400 adult Zimbabwean citizens who participated in an Afrobarometer survey in 2018² wanted to see perpetrators of past violations held to account through prosecution. This was in comparison to 28% of participants who wanted perpetrators to be granted amnesty (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018b:14-5). As such, the mandate of the NPRC must be extended beyond its ten-year mandate beyond 19 August 2023 (Chitagu, 2019).

Given this, the NTJWG's calls for the inclusion of the state in TJ processes due to "its involvement and control of the infrastructures of violence and conflict" (NTJWG, 2018:23) thus lead one to question such an olive branch from civil society which is to be met with a disingenuous nod from elites. Such probes are sustained by public declarations by President Mnangagwa such as his January 2018 interview at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Here, Mnangagwa expresses his government's TJ mandate as "nothing more than [him] putting legislation" for a commission of inquiry to draft recommendations (Mnangagwa, 2018, in Tarusarira, 2019:210). He goes on to dismiss commitments to address, apologise to, and compensate victims for past violations such as the 1982-1987 Gukurahundi Massacres to which he was a key architect (Coltart, 2016:134). Furthermore, in a failed bid to bring "closure" to affected families of the Gukurahundi Massacres in April 2019, the Mnangagwa regime pledged to facilitate the exhumation and re-burial of victims who remain in mass burial sites across Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. President Mnangagwa's disregard for the need to apologise further shows disingenuous efforts towards transformative remorse (Moyo, 2019c; Mutsaka, 2019).

The lack of progression in domestic and continental policy restricts the legitimate formation of a "Victims and Witness Protection Act" as recommended in the report (NTJWG, 2018:28). Moreover, fear exists with the ordinary person recognising this institution as an instrument of the state given the omnipresence of state-sponsored organised violence and torture on those who testify against the government narrative. The assumption that victims and survivors will be comfortable with revisiting their trauma reflects practitioner insensitivity on sites of historical and structural trauma. This is especially true for perpetrations that have had a significant number of years pass in their aftermath (Eppel, 2013:231; LaCapra, 1999:721-7; Ndlovu, 2019:240).

There is no doubt that potential merits of transitional justice are recognisable to those seeking actual reform. Ideally, "justice measures that are employed in transitional times not only create a culture of accountability, but also are a form of political restructuring [by limiting] governmental power and also construct the transition" (Moyo, 2019b:188). For Zimbabwe though, the facilitation of a 'liberal' democratic state is currently, and has always been, at odds with the political will of the state and its elites. This is measurable given past and present opportunities to structure political settlements in ways that broker national peace, healing and reconciliation (Eppel, 2013:211-50).

As a liberal aspiring concept, TJ suffers an ideological disjuncture within a state such as Zimbabwe where civil-military culture is based on right-wing ideologies (de Waal, 2002; Teitel, 2000:4). TJ is enacted through positive “institutional and individual reputation, esteem, and legitimacy, these processes of communication and socialization” (Dancy et al., 2013:8) which contribute to a shift in political cultures and behavioural changes. Mani (2008, in Eppel, 2013:221) warns that TJ practitioners must be wary as perpetration is often “by the same war criminals with the same abusive, violent and exploitative means and devastating effects on victims”. Endemic violence remains a problem in Zimbabwe.

1.1 Articulating Justice and Endemic Impunity

Though other methods of engagement are discussed throughout the thesis; rectificatory, distributive and legal justice are three dimensions of justice that may be engaged with during moments of transition (Mani, 2002:5). From a state-level analysis, judicial legal processes precede rectificatory and distributive justice. Though legalism provides a solid base towards delivering justice, real life experiences present limitations to delivering justice through singular lenses of legal practice. Lived experiences must be accommodated and amplified in the TJ process. Likewise, rectificatory justice in Zimbabwe must facilitate the cessation of state-sponsored violence against citizens, open-up the civil society space, all whilst demilitarising government politics and the institutions that support it. Such actions would help repair the civic trust deficit (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018b; Eppel, 2013; McEvoy, 2007:421-3, 440).

In Zimbabwe, Chapter 10:32, Section 10(1)(d) of the NPRC Act of 2018 allows for collaboration with the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) which regularly performs executive orders of subversion under Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2002, as well as the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act (MOPA) of 2019 (NPRC, 2018). In January 2019, the ZRP was part the violent crackdown against fuel-hike protestors that saw “15 deaths, 340 injured, and more than 1,000 arrests” (Simpson & Krönke, 2019:1). If the NPRC continues to work with an unreformed security community – even in the name of collaboration with government – there will be a maintenance of a violent social order. Engagements during moments of transition or political settlements are also difficult when the judiciary, as part of the security community, remains

captured by securocrats who control state functions (Ball et al., 2003:265; ICG, 2010:11-3). Given this, the cumulative effects of a lack of accountability and truth-telling are trust deficits such as those which remain in Zimbabwean communities. The denial of justice found in protectionist civil-military relations compromise legitimacy, effectiveness and security as the three dimensions of progressive governance which affect prospects for social cohesion and growth (Brinkerhoff, 2005:9-11). Albeit this, it is important to refute the simplistic assumption that TJ efforts will proceed in Zimbabwe once the rule of law and the credibility of the judiciary as an institution have been restored given the legacy of endemic silences and denialisms in the state by governing officials (Eppel, 2013:213; Moyo, 2019b:9).

Goredema (2004:103–104) notes that a differently structured judiciary at independence was more likely to have transformed the public space and delivered societal transformation under the guise of demographic representation. This is buttressed by Chitiyo's (2009:26) observations about the flawed nature of the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement. Additionally, Eppel (2013:213) notes that “the excesses of the liberation war were amnestied in 1979 and 1980”, rather than addressed. Coltart (2016) similarly laments:

crimes [from 1978], along with atrocities committed by all the armies in the war, were never prosecuted as they were covered by an amnesty agreed to by all the parties to the Lancaster House settlement in 1979. The amnesty, combined [with] the absence of any truth commission, resulted in these horrors never being confronted and dealt with, as they should have been. The use of torture within our security forces remains a plague in our nation. (p. 85)

In 1981, the Entumbane Uprisings saw fatal clashes between Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) ex-combatants. Resultantly, the government called for the 1981 Dumbutshena Commission to be set up. Again, in 1983, the Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry was set up after a call for investigations into the killing of a supposed 1,500 political dissidents in the Midlands and Matabeleland regions – the forewarning of what we now know as the 1982-1987 Gukurahundi Massacres. Both reports were finalised and submitted to President Mugabe though they were never released for public consumption as government said it feared the resurgence of revenge violence (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), 1997; Huyse, 2003; Murambadoro & Wielenga,

2015:35-6; Ndou, 2012; Zimbabwe Independent, 2019). This is indicative of both pervasive cultures of impunity and the amnesia legalised through executive power to apply amnesties which command persistent denials of justice for victims and survivors of state-sponsored violence (Ricoeur, 2003:353, in McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012:414).

As was the colonial legacy of impunity, the Zimbabwean ruling elite adopted the British tradition of tokenised commissions of inquiry which – particularly in settler colonies – often purported to take the voices of the victims of colonial violence into account yet neutralised justice through the courts by granting amnesties to perpetrators (Sitze, 2013:11-4). The tactical legacy of silencing of victims through the granting of amnesties to perpetrators has been one of the biggest impediments to accessing justice in Zimbabwe. Despite this, ‘judicial rhetoric’ within the discourse of commissions of enquiry allows for the state to portray a narrative of lamentation despite sponsoring the violence at hand (Sitze, 2013:14). The endemic problem exacerbates challenges to non-recurrence of violence and injustice whilst further wielding control of state institutions and the providence of social protections to securocrats and the elite networks which maintain them. To illustrate this, Constitution of Zimbabwe, Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013, Chapter 12 advocates for independent commissions to be set up towards democratic advancement in the country. Section 235 of the same document however specifies the commissions as independent yet they are “not subject to control by any external actors (including political actors), they remain accountable to the parliament” which is inundated by ruling elite loyalists (Murambadoro & Wielenga, 2015:37-8).

Under the 1983-1990 State of Emergency, human rights abuses continued despite the declarations of peace under the façade of national healing and reconciliation. Eppel (2004:50), commenting on the cumulative effects of tokenised pardons, states that: “the 1988 amnesty was one in a long line of amnesties since 1979 and is part of an established pattern of perpetrators being pardoned at the expense of victim”. This further revealed strategies towards an ulterior political agenda by ZANU-PF in their quest to solidify their power (Amnesty International, 2002:16-9; Bratton, 2016:220; Coltart, 2016:149-155; Ndlovu, 2019:144; Scarnecchia, 2011:93). Commenting on the constitutional clemency clause in their report *Zimbabwe: The toll of impunity*, Amnesty International note that,

“[i]n the 1953 constitution of Rhodesia, this clause empowered the governor and later the head of state to effectively grant a pardon to any person convicted of a crime. In the 1969 constitution, this power of pardon was widened to allow the head of state to grant clemency to those involved in criminal activities – whether they have been convicted or before there is a determination of guilt. In the [Zimbabwean Constitution preceding the 2013 Amendment] Section 31(i) gives the President the right to grant a pardon, amnesty or clemency to those convicted or due to be convicted of a crime. There are no definite criteria spelled out to limit this power or provide for further review by Zimbabwean society, and therefore it can be used to reinforce impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations” (Amnesty International, 2002:16).

The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No.7) of 1987 replaced the role of the Prime Minister. This further centralised power and personalised control within the office of the President. Again in 1995, pardons once again granted to perpetrators of electoral violence justified by “presidential discretion to prevent prosecution of party cadres guilty of acts of political intimidation” (Bratton, 2016:220; Eppel, 2013:213). At the turn of the century, the trend was clear when the Clemency Order of 2000 was granted for kidnappings and torture. Rape, murder and fraud violations were excluded to create an impression of future accountability but were instead considered “beyond the reach of the justice system” (Amnesty International, 2002:19). The cyclical effects of state-sanctioned organised violence and torture have continued towards elections where manipulation often occurs and violence is unleashed when ZANU-PF authority is challenged. In 2008, following a 47.9% win by the MDC in the presidential vote, widespread violence and torture was unleashed on citizens. Even with over 2000 civilian deaths and over 100 officers indicted, military General Chedondo defended the actions of the security forces as a defence to President Mugabe’s integrity and legitimacy (BBC, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2008:13-20; Moore, 2014:118). This is reflective of a flawed governance structure and a compromised judiciary as the powers of Section 31(i) of the Lancaster Constitution were invoked.

There are fundamental impediments to undertaking transformative efforts in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Pivoting on legacies of amnesties, these include, but are not limited to:

halting criminal investigations against perpetrators, preventing victims from receiving compensation, obscuring who gave [the] order to commit violence, preventing the investigation by human rights

defenders and the independent media of abuses, and creating the impression that future violations would be officially condoned. (Bratton, 2016: 220)

These tactics are steeped in inherited colonial legacies (Amnesty International, 2002:16; Goredema, 2004:103-4). Ruling elites have always used the law for the protection of the security community as “[c]olonial injustices were legalised by unjust laws” (Eppel, 2013:213). The legacies of the captured judiciary have continued to contribute to the denialism of governing officials regarding the existence of, or their involvement in, violence in Zimbabwe. To date, “[j]udicial positions are not attained by election in Zimbabwe” (Goredema, 2004:103). The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and other justices are appointed by the President at the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. This remains a problem where repressive legislation such as the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) of 1960, Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2002, and Maintenance of Peace and Order Act (MOPA) of 2019 are assented to as legitimating provisions of violence within the law and maintain cyclical legacies of colonial repression (Bratton, 2016:237; Langa, 2019). Likewise, with local and international criticism not a deterrent, government continues to regard itself as “superior to the judiciary and to have the license to pick and choose which decisions to comply with and which to ignore” (Goredema, 2004:105). This is further testament to the lack of commitment to institutional reconstruction (Bratton, 2016:26; Eppel, 2013:226-7; Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:81-3).

This thesis takes the view that, should current political cultures persist, amnesties will continue to be “serial amnesties” (Bratton, 2016:220) granted whilst presidential immunities and the power to grant them exist in Zimbabwe’s Constitution. Entered into force on 22 May 2013, the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No. 20) repealed the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution. This followed from Article VI of the GPA that granted Zimbabweans the right to construct their own Constitution that focused on socio-economic rather than civil-political rights (Raftopolous, 2013a:972). For liberation nationalists, the rule of law was never “a means to political victory”; rather, it was “a standard against which the Rhodesian Front could be held up and found wanting” (Alexander, 2011:556). The liberation war was a means to establishing a vaguely defined “people’s power” through the destruction of the colonial state and its legalistic controls (Mandaza, 1991:71-90, in Raftopolous, 2013a:972).

Given this, divergences were illuminated between these and other political actors (the opposition MDC, civil society, amongst others) during constitutional drafting deliberations (Raftopolous, 2013a:974). Despite finding consensus to draft the new Constitution, pre-held notions on the rule of law may explain the retention of certain the provisions of the Constitutional of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No.7) of 1987. For instance, Section 98 speaks to presidential immunity to be retained in accordance to the “good faith” of the president however the personalisation of power to suit bargaining elite interests (Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013; Khan, 2005:11). This is reflective of the Indemnity and Compensation Law of 1975 which “granted prospective approval for all acts undertaken in the course of official duty” (Bratton, 2016:219). This “good faith” provision assured immunity for security personnel inciting violence and made legal immunity subjective where perpetrators could claim just motives for torture and violation (CCJP, 1976 in Bratton, 2016:219). Other entrenched assurances for the ruling elite are developed in Chapter III (3).

Political cultures devoid of accountability continue to allow the government to engage in systemic subversion of their citizens’ human rights. (Scarnecchia, 2011:93). In negotiating amnesties, one needs to interrogate the impact of their deliverance in the absence of truth and subsequent accountability. McEvoy and Mallinder (2012:413) refer to amnesties as “the process by which states exercise their sovereign right to mercy by extinguishing criminal or civil liability for past crimes”. In Zimbabwe, presidential mercy is granted to perpetrators who execute orders towards violent subversion from elites. Here perpetration is recognised however the possibility of persecution is negated. Amnesties fall under the assumption of the formation of a new political settlement within communities based in revelations and acceptance of the truth. Mani (2008:255) however reminds us that even the best truth commissions are “narrow and limited if the mechanism does not go beyond the handful of individual perpetrators prosecuted and if the victims are not acknowledged and vindicated”. Generally, amnesties are “linked...to processes designed to encourage former combatants to offer truth in return for non-prosecution” (McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012:415, see also, 432). Broad-based truth-seeking initiatives at national level bare the potential of uncovering injustices and manipulation of institutions (Mani, 2008:256). In Zimbabwe however, securocrats face no tangible consequences that would propose workable solutions for their removal from spaces of influence or prosecution (Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12-3). The result

is that there have been too few expressions of truth juxtaposed against too many amnesties granted without the exchange of the prior. This shall be elaborated in Chapter III (1). For now, framing political will remains important.

2. Framing Patronage and Political Settlements in Zimbabwe

A pivotal concept in understanding the political will of elites in Zimbabwe, is clientelism as a practice in their political settlements. Political settlements can be defined as “social orders characterized by distributions of organi[s]ational power that together with specific formal and informal institutions effectively achieve at least the minimum requirements of political and economic sustainability for [a given] society” (Khan, 2018: 670-671). Di John and Putzel (2009: 4) outline the typology as “consensual understanding[s] of the best interests of all actors, usually political elites, as administered by institutes of political power”. As such, the application of political settlements is an outcome of “complex organi[s]ational agency interactions” thus rendering them contextually specific and fluid (Khan, 2018:692). Within political settlements, clientelism is an exchange of varied benefits for individual interests in the form of tenure as well as access to rents and services between individuals or privileged groups of unequal socio-political statuses (Arias, 2006, and Hilgers, 2011, in Miltin, 2013:6). Rents must be distinguished from resources.

Rents are excess incomes that accrue to factors of production in uncompetitive markets, for example, the rents that accrue to a government-created monopoly, or to economic actors in pre-capitalist settings. In neo-classical economic analyses, rents and the effort expended on securing them (rent-seeking) are regarded as unproductive and inefficient. Partly in consequence, the term “rent” has acquired a generally pejorative connotation in development circles. (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:50)

Dynamics in patron-client power relations dictate distribution of rents and resources in patronage economies and neutral citizens remain excluded from these benefits albeit their grievances (Hickey, 2015). Such economies are characterised by a culture of elite accumulation and control over state resources in what Alexander and McGregor (2013:758) refer to as a “‘survivalist’ form

of livelihood”. Elites linked to ZANU-PF, as will be discussed in the thesis, sanction degrees of clientelism in survivalist political settlements to this end.

Khan notes the origins of neopatrimonial analyses through Weber’s rational bureaucratic model of governance (Weber, 1978:1006-1110 in Khan, 2005:10). This model was characterised by the administration of economic growth supported by traditional sources of authority and legitimacy in pre-modern and pre-capitalist societies by ruling elites. Here, patrimonialism was identified as “one of the most important of these pre-capitalist forms of governance, where allegiance to a leader [was] based on personal loyalty and traditional legitimacy” (Weber, 1978:1006-1110, in Khan, 2005:10). This is buttressed by Mkandawire who reminds us that the concept of neopatrimonialism itself is not new. The author notes that “[i]n its early incarnation, it was not about corruption or weakness of the state. Rather, it was simply a way to exercise power that incorporated Weberian forms of patrimonialism and rational-legal authority” (Eisenstadt, 1966, in Mkandawire, 2015:565). In the post-Cold War period, with modern waves of capitalism, the modern state has adapted.

Rational bureaucratic forms of rule now create conditions for capitalism supported by democracy which is essential for the survival of modern democratic states within the global capitalist system. Neopatrimonialism is a term used to describe “different styles of exercising authority” that must be nuanced across cultures, societies and states (Mkandawire, 2015:564). According to Khan (2010:10), respect for the rule of law within the bureaucratic structure allows for strengthened institutional capacities which, for the most part, allow formal institutions to execute their mandates impartially at distance from elite patrons. Modern postcolonial developing states – particularly in Africa – have however been classified as neopatrimonialist in attempts to “explain the persistence of pre-modern state [governance] structures” in modern times (Khan, 2005:11; Mkandawire, 2015:564). Van de Welle (2001:51) cites that African political authorities are traditionally derived from “dyadic exchanges that [are present in] the village to the highest reaches of the central state”. It must however be noted that current “approach to patronage, corruption and ‘parallel structures’” are not in line with traditional African values (McGregor, 2013:786).

Van de Welle highlights neopatrimonialism seen in “hybrid” African regimes such as Nigeria and Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko as instances where states are bureaucratically sound in theory yet “constantly subverted by a patrimonial logic” in practice (Boone, 1992, Callaghy, 1984, and Joseph, 1987, in van de Welle, 2001:51-2). Mkwandawire (2015:572), commenting on the contextual specificity of neopatrimonialism across the continent, notes that “the exercise of extracting a logic that explains Africa’s poor economic performance is extremely complex and ultimately arbitrary”. The author warns of the dangers of homogenising African narratives of neopatrimonialism through “preanalytical dispossessions” of one’s own biased cultural lenses. Each case must thus be examined specifically as contexts vary (Mkwandawire, 2015:572).

Widely accepted though, is the state of corruption which is typically embedded in networks of access in neopatrimonialism. The tenets of this are then linked to clientelism and justified by elites as mere exchanges for elite safeguarding (Tendi, 2013; van de Welle, 2001:51-2). Patron-client relations are solidified when “clients agree to provide political support to the patron in exchange for payoffs that the patron can deliver by using political power to capture public resources” (Khan, 2005:10). Tenets of clientelism are then illuminated through prebends, patronage and tributes which act as navigators of continuous political settlements by including and excluding bargaining elites as well as citizens from social protections within societies. ZANU-PF has used, and continues to use, such tactics for the renegotiation of political, economic and social control in Zimbabwe (Raftopolous, 2009; Tendi, 2013:841).

2.1 The State of Patronage Organisation

Patronage economies are founded in internal elite settlements to accumulate public resources. This is to ensure not only elite power, but also elite stability (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758; Moore, 2012; van de Walle, 2001:16). A key tenet of such neopatrimonialism is “the personalisation of power” (Khan, 2005:11). This is different to a rule-following Weberian-type state where formal institutions are typically impersonal (Khan, 2010:10). Patron-client organisation within ruling elites is divided by horizontal and vertical distributions of power (Khan, 2010:64). Understanding

patron-client organisation within ruling coalitions is pivotal to understanding how it translates into the way patron elites interact with clients outside of the elite sphere as well as with neutral citizens.

Horizontal distributions of power lie in excluded factions exerting power over the ruling elite and the internal distribution of power within the ruling elite. Weak horizontal, excluded coalitions allow the ruling elite to feel secure in their tenure. In theory, this would motivate the ruling elite to focus on growth and development strategies, rather than on factionalism and opposition; however, in practice, the politics of accumulation and loyalism take over (Chitiyo, 2009; Khan, 2010: 64–65; Tendi, 2013). In vertical distributions of power, there exist higher and lower levels of internal coalitions that are included and excluded from those in the upper level with executive access respectively. Though the lower levels typically depend on those in the upper levels in patron-client relations, they can sometimes mobilise bargaining power and limit implementation of issues of concern to the upper levels if their needs are not met (Khan, 2010: 65). The more powerful those who are excluded become from the periphery become, the more those with executive access seek to thwart them (Khan, 2010:65). These key political differences, however, focus on formal, rather than informal, distributions of power that affect the ruling coalition. Informality can be seen through external interference of the security community, business networks, and other clients, where government officials are assumed to be impartial bureaucrats. This is, however, not the case in Zimbabwe, where securocrats form the ruling elite in the ZANU-PF party and government (Khan, 2010; Tendi, 2013).

Khan's (2010: 64–66) model of horizontal and vertical distributions of power within elite political settlements must be extended to analysing asymmetric power relations between the citizen and the state, when examining the endemic nature of clientelism in Zimbabwe. Horizontal distributions of power must be sampled as patron-client relations evident within the elite bargaining space, and vertical distributions of power as the expansion of ruling elite control through alliances within broader society (Kriger, 2012: 13). Exclusive horizontal distributions of rents expressed in this adaptation impede access to socio-economic justice for wider society, whilst adapted vertical networks solidify these constraints through displays of loyalty towards the ruling elite. Ideally, spreading resources within society would facilitate greater access and subsequent prosperity for the average person. In Zimbabwe, however, the vertical allocation of resources has been

characterised by widespread horizontal-type settlements with elite loyalists, thus producing anti-development outcomes. Examples of this will be considered in Chapter IV (1). These are evident through widespread violent subversion and patron-client relations which cripple the functioning of institutions meant to safeguard citizen interests. Consequently, such exclusionary institutions inhibit incentives for people to save, invest, and innovate by supporting a culture of patronage which erodes the rule of law, creates insecurity in property rights, and in general, creates economic disincentives. In Zimbabwe, cyclical fiscal crises from 1997 have persisted as a result. This subsequently prevents rent generation and drains the economy of vital state resources, whilst protecting elite interests (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013:371-410; Dawson & Kelsall, 2013; van de Welle, 2001:51-3).

Access dependent on power politics is key in analysing the Zimbabwean case. As a concept, power politics is characterised by a hierarchy of political settlements that enable its existence (Bratton, 2016). To gain power, one must have privileged access to a limited or elite network and subvert alternative networks that challenge its survival (Di John & Putzel, 2009:14; Kelsall, 2018; Khan, 2010:5; Kriger, 2012). The maintenance of hegemony through power politics “involves both consent and coercion” (Moore, 1991:474). Hegemonies are both strong and weak. Stronger hegemonies include more actors within society in the political settlement deemed acceptable for a given society’s narrative. Weaker hegemonies allow ruling elites to control the dominant narrative (Miliband, 1990:7, in Moore, 1991:474). A “critical factor” for consent in such hegemonies is for the ruling elite to attain legitimacy. This, however, often occurs through repressive apparatuses, whereby elites safeguard interests for their survival and seek to remain unopposed (Therborn, 1980:109, and Weitzer, 1990, in Moore, 1991:475).

Amongst bargaining elites in Zimbabwe, the weaker form exists where power is centred in ruling elitist choices thus failing to advance citizens’ needs (Sylvester, 1990:399 in Moore, 1991:474). Arguments that free the MDC from such criticism miss the understandings of a persistent lack of appeal to the rural voter and failure to perform during the GNU for the main opposition party. These form plausible rebuttals for a lack of evolution of the MDC since it entered the political arena in the late 1990s. This despite cautions for the opposition party to not posture themselves in the elitism of the urban voter and the ruling class. A weaker rebuttal of this argument can however

be made that even during the GNU, the MDC had no real opportunities at exerting political power (Hoffman, 2012:144; Kriger, 2012:13; Matyszak & Reeler, 2011).

Matyszak and Reeler (2011:57), Tendi (2013:841) and van de Welle (2001:52-3) cite the maintenance of power by weak hegemonies, through the tenets of clientelism and electoral violence by the president, as key to understanding the nature of elite power dynamics. Ideally, it would be possible that factions within the ruling elite favouring democratic capacity building of the state could empower civil society to be strong enough to form a counter-hegemonic movement and allow for the opening-up of the democratic space. This would create a stronger hegemonic base with legitimacy steeped in societal consent (Moore, 1991:477). In practice, Zimbabwe remains far from this realisation in 2019. In states where electoral legitimacy is absent, patron-client networks form the basis of continued political access for factions of the ruling elites. These factions concern themselves with self-preservation through strategic loyalties rather than preservation through society. The president, as the centre of power in the state, shapes subsequent resources and policies around narratives surrounding him and his legitimised networks (Tendi, 2013:837-41; van de Welle, 2001:52-3).

Both formal and informal networks within and outside of political power structures are necessary to examine to gain a holistic picture of various actors present in the political arena (Kriger, 2012). As Khan (2010:5) highlights, “the exercise of power in developing countries cannot simply be focused on the protection and operation of formal institutions”. These networks are not all based within the structures of the state and party systems as there are groupings within political networks which are outside formal institutions that have disruptive potential (Kelsall, 2018; Khan, 2010:5). Examining vertical and horizontal distributions of resources allows for deeper insights into the nuanced nature of clientelism. When clientelism is based on the “extensive use of state resources for political purposes”, economic justice remains challenged by privileged beneficiaries (van de Welle, 2001:52). Given this, variations of both horizontal distribution within the ZANU-PF elite and vertical distribution to auxiliary networks are not to be viewed as mutually exclusive when examining the Zimbabwean case (Behuria et al., 2017:512; Khan, 2010:64–5; van de Welle, 2001:51-3).

To further clarify, limitations to accessing power in Zimbabwe do not translate into the country operating within a limited access order. Despite powerful elites possessing the social tools that allow them to keep their power, as well as access to rents and resources being limited within elite networks, the process of accumulation does not allow the political system to manipulate “the economy to create rents as a means of solving the problem of violence” (North et al., 2007:3). Instead, the lack of rent creation and the extraction of the few rents and resources produced by the economy for elite enrichment, breed more violence, as they breed a lack of social protections. Physical subversion, fear, and structural violence are understood as tools for elite preservation, rather than as risks that may cost elites their power. Additional complications lie in the militarisation of the elite space of Zimbabwe, which will be discussed later. Current prospects for political cooperation outside this narrative remain slim (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013; Khan, 2010; Moore, 2012; North et al., 2007:1–3; North et al., 2013; Tendi, 2013; van de Walle, 2001:53).

CHAPTER III

1. Selective Truths, Silenced Communities

The ruling ZANU-PF's mandate has been to appease various members within the security community to secure elite interests. This is done by solidifying Zimbabwe's roots as a highly-securitised state. Chuma (2004:124) notes that the public broadcaster, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), has wholly aligned itself with ZANU-PF propaganda, rather than seek to facilitate national reconciliation. Propaganda experienced throughout ZANU-PF rule has shown clear motives towards hegemonic *de facto* one-party stateism (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:51–55; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011; Ranger, 2004). The 1981 Dumbutshena and 1983 Chihambakwe Commission reports remain key in unpacking the truth of the past (Huyse, 2003). Their release at the time could have allowed for timely justice interventions for victims in the early stages of Zimbabwe's transition from colonial Rhodesia. Unfortunately, as Eppel (2013:215) notes, the position was that “healing should take place without revealing” particularly in Matabeleland. As such victimhood remains hierarchical.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:1) cites this as “a particularly nationalistic-monologic narrative of the nation that enabled its leaders claim to control over the direction of national history; responsibility for the birth of the nation; and uncontested right to perpetual power in Zimbabwe”. The 1990s saw a decline in this *Chimurenga*³ narrative and allowed for alternative governance narratives to be heard outside the confines of ZANU-PF's narrow “patriotic history” doctrine (Ranger, 2004:215; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011:5-8). With pre-existing tensions between labour politics and those of a national agenda, it was easy for the ruling party's repression tactics to spill over to the opposition MDC after ZAPU was subverted into silence (Scarnecchia, 2008, and Sachikonye, 2011, in Moore, 2012:4; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011:1, 14-15). Nationalist agendas remain steeped in wartime *Chimurenga* ideologies according to which liberation can only be legitimated through the lens of the ruling party. For them, the justification of state-sponsored violence, has been political exploits targeted at the “annihilation of enemies and opponents of ZANU-PF” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011:1, see also, Bratton, 2016:55). The control of the national narrative extends to supporting subversions of alternative narratives that would otherwise implicate securocrats in human rights violations.

To illustrate this, victims of the liberation war were beneficiaries of the 1997 War Victims Compensation Act. The pay out of Z\$1.8billion not only crippled the Zimbabwean economy on the infamous Black Friday of 14 November 1997, but was again reflective of the hierarchy of victimhood under the *Chimurenga* narrative. Compensation, as a form of acknowledgement, remains politically motivated towards safeguarding elite interests, without disregard for the effects on the common person (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:55; Eppel, 2013:224; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:32; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). With commitments to civilian victims receiving compensation pervasively lacking, despite it being a key victim demand towards acknowledgement of perpetrations against them, efforts at engagements in the aftermath of violence seem unlikely whilst war credentials are more politically valuable than citizens (Bratton, 2016:220; Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:94). This perpetuates a rotating cycle of perpetration and amnesties, whilst keeping conversations around transitional justice as just that.

The tokenisation of truth-seeking and justice, as shown, was a distraction, whilst the solidification of clientelist civil-military political settlements occurred within the ruling elite. These were missed opportunities in pushing for commitments to truth-telling, restorative justice, and accountability. As such, the lack of political will towards SSR in Zimbabwe – discussed in Chapters IV (1) and V – has further entrenched securocrats in the governance strategies of the ruling elites and their allies (Mutisi, 2011:4; Kriger, 2012). Granting agency to the deceased by collating previously documented accounts of perpetration – through medical records, commissions of enquiry, and others – “allows them to participate from their graves and contribute to justice, healing and reconciliation posthumously” (Zimbabwe Independent, 2019). Likewise, “giving voice to the muted and the speechless is part of the transformation of the meanings of the past, involving profound redefinitions and rewriting of [an otherwise doctored] history” (Jelin, 2003:86). Political tactics that strategically silence the truth, however, continue, and their legacies continue to be felt in 2019.

The prospects for non-recurrence which lie in the three dimensions of justice are all based in expressions of truth which designates accountability for perpetration and victimhood. Without these, only unstable advancements towards social cohesion are possible in the aftermath of

violence. In this way, justice and reconciliation are genuine and some level of trust and transparency in the process beyond judicial provisions is attained thus raising the potential for sustainability. Shelved trauma and denialism embedded in communities promotes citizen apathy, resentment for other members of society may result in a resurgence of violence to avenge perpetration (Jelin, 2003). None are ideal scenarios. Mani (2008:260) implores transitional governments and security forces to work with TJ practitioners before violence becomes cyclical, “endemic and impossible to eradicate”. She cites indigenous cultures and practices as having key roles in steering affected communities towards peace (Mani, 2008:260). In this regard, it is important to re-engage minority cultures in national narratives to aid avenues for effective community-based reconstruction that can spill over into broader national cohesion in the aftermath of violence. Micro-level settlements within communities remain important to promote community healing from the effects of pervasive militarisation. This is necessary to manage social cohesion, before widespread SSR can be rolled out.

Considering minorities is useful in understanding the state of social cohesion within a nation as the grievances of the most suppressed reveal the various manifestations of violence in society. The creation of a national template for the guarantee of non-recurrence of violence by addressing all minority grievances at their various intersections is ideal (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1991). This allows for more people from different cultures to tell their own truths and nuance the conversation around healing to be more inclusive. For instance, in Zimbabwe, forgotten minorities such as the Kalanga, Sotho, and many other ethnic groups who inhabit Matabeleland and Midlands, and who were arguably the most affected groups during the 1982-1987 Gukurahundi Massacres and other injustices as a result need to be granted agency of voice to tell their stories too. Homogenising their narratives into ‘the Ndebele story’ continues to be problematic (Eppel, 2013:231-5; Ranger, 1989:166-7).

It is unfortunate that in 2019, Khanyisela Moyo’s book *Postcolonial Transitional Justice: Zimbabwe and Beyond* lacks nuance in identifying victims and minority groups in the state (Moyo, 2019b: 136-149). Prioritising one ethnic minority further silences other groups and is an act of structural violence in and of itself. The exacerbation of this legacy of silencing by promoting “one black minority group” (Moyo, 2019b: 9, see also, 136–149) is careless at best in the reconstruction

of exclusive narratives of national healing, whilst silencing and tokenising the memories of victims from other ethnic groups. Also, pervasive state denialism in granting legitimacy to some eras of violence over others makes it difficult to redress cyclical occurrences of violence in controlled narratives – especially if they affect differing ethnic groups at differing times (Eppel, 2013:212–213).

2. Cyclical articulations of violence in the absence of acknowledgement

The cases to be discussed below do not disqualify other instances of violence such as the farm invasions and electoral violence of 2000 as well as other pervasive instances of violence which have, and continue to occur, in Zimbabwe. The cases presented reflect ruptural moments in Zimbabwe's society that have spurred on legacies of violence rather than encouraging national healing in their aftermath.

2.1 Massacres during emergencies

During the 1983-1990 State of Emergency, a violent crackdown on the supposed 1,500 dissidents in the Midlands – a nationally “contested operational zone” between ZANLA and ZIPRA – and Matabeleland provinces resulted in the massacre of over 20,000 civilians and the displacement of an additional 400,000 by the North Korean-trained ‘Fifth Brigade’ division of the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) who were trained for this purpose (Bratton, 2016:50; CCJP, 1997:30; Coltart, 2016:149-55). As Bratton (2016:46) asserts, the attack was because of suspicions over Joshua Nkomo's accommodation of a Vorster-Kaunda détente in 1975 (Bratton, 2016:46). Furthermore, the advancement of ‘Super ZAPU’⁴ posed a serious threat to the ZANU arm of government (Meredith, 2002:64, 2014:628-9). Nkomo (1984:154-62) however maintains that the meetings held – with Sithole (ZANU), Muzorewa (ZAPU), President Kaunda of Zambia, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith as well as, South African Prime Minister Vorster, amongst others – were merely peace talks towards power sharing and military cohesion in the region. He also notes that growing divisions and mistrust was mainly within ZANU and ZANLA and threats towards ZAPU were a deflection of ZANU's internal crisis (Nkomo, 1984:158; Bratton, 2016:50). During the Gukurahundi violence, “some 20 000 ZAPU supporters surrendered their ZAPU cards

and bought ZANU PF cards as an insurance policy” (Coltart, 2016:150). This was further coerced consolidation of ZANU power. The violence was comparable to that under Ian Smith’s in 1965 State of Emergency where citizens in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces were previously subjected to curfews, targeted murders, torture, rape, starvation and other human rights abuses. The perpetrators were pardoned in the ‘Gukurahundi Amnesty’ or Clemency Order (1) of 18 April 1988 under Section 3(1) of the Constitution (Coltart, 2016:149-155; Ndlovu, 2019:144; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:32; Scarnecchia, 2011:93).

The Unity Accord of 22 December of 1987 was signed to cease the violence that had ensued from 1981. Here, ZANU formerly became ZANU-PF and ZAPU became PF-ZAPU. The agreement was an opportune time to restore “cordial relations and peace and security” between the Patriotic Front liberation parties as well as to the people of the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces affected by the violence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:31). However, the overarching shortcoming of the elite settlement was the lack of reconstruction strategies that would have forged human security developments and healthier civil-military relations. As Rupiya (2004:90) observes, this potential moment for reconciliation “did not extend to defence and security decision-making, command and control realms of the state”. This was indicative of a power play by ZANU-PF elites who dominated the political arena to internally safeguard their allies and assets whilst externally performing statesmanship.

The legacy of 1987 cemented exclusionary, elitist political agreements in independent Zimbabwe which have continued even in the post-Mugabe era (Bratton, 2016:52-9; Norman, 2008:79). The elite agreement sought to “conquer the last frontier of resistance to ZANU-PF hegemony” (Bratton, 2016:55) rather than heal a tortured nation. This was done by imposing on civilians what would become the foundations of “the authoritarian nation building strategies of ZANU-PF” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:32). The naming of the Gukurahundi Massacres speaks to the justification to eradicate enemies of the state whilst promoting legacies of geo-ethnic and political division in Zimbabwe even in 2019 (Rwafa, 2012:318-9). *Gukurahundi* – meaning “the sweeping away of rubbish”, chaff or grain (Meredith, 2002:66) further illuminates its mandate as “a harbinger of death” (Rwafa, 2012:315) to those who opposed the elite. Had there been a commitment to redress for perpetration in the political settlement of the 1987 Unity Accord, it would have served as a

pivotal moment for formulating social cohesion within the state. Instead, pardons were granted to dissidents whilst victim's narratives were dismissed and subverted with further violence. The 1988 Gukurahundi Amnesty and subsequent amnesties for perpetrators of state sponsored violence which continue to be granted, are indicative of how well the culture of impunity has serviced the ruling party. Citing Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, in Tarusarira, 2019:210), "Gukurahundi [must be viewed] as a leitmotif of ZANU-PF". Breaking this cycle will be difficult (Bratton, 2016:52-9; CCJP, 1997; Coltart, 2016:107; Crane et al., 2008:5; Eppel, 2013:213-4).

Reflecting on the Unity Accord, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 31–33) notes certain general conditions for post-conflict settlements, which are applicable in an analysis of the accord, with a view to identifying its missed opportunities for achieving healthy civil-military relations, social cohesion, peace, and security in Zimbabwe. First, political prospects, rather than those for civilian and socio-economic rebuilding, were prioritised. Consequently, the power-sharing agreement was elitist and had no provisions for compensation or redress for victims of perpetration. Second, the post-conflict settlement failed to regenerate human capacity, by including capacity-building initiatives, for genuine integration in the affected areas. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 32) further highlights this as a missed opportunity for psychological rebuilding in traumatised communities. The third aspect relates to judicial independence – i.e. the judiciary's ability to administer retributive justice to all identified perpetrators, without fear or favour. Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes that in Zimbabwe, courts are denied a fundamental peacebuilding role due to elite interference and manipulation of the law concerning clemencies as articulated in Chapter II (1.1). Lastly, he notes the pivotal role of economic rebuilding where people have lost jobs and homes during periods of conflict. A legacy of misrepresentative post-conflict settlements, parallel to that of silences, violence, and impunities within the ruling elites, was ingrained into Zimbabwe's political culture when the Unity Accord failed to deliver the above (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003: 32).

2.2 Removal of the 'dirt' (again)

The closing of the political space to alternative voices against the ZANU-PF narrative was again detrimental, in 2005, with the start of Operation Murambatsvina. Following increased anti-corruption protests, the government sought to appease urban voters struggling with rising

unemployment and inflation⁵, by allowing the relaxing of legislation for informal trading. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), however, still won landslide victories in urban areas (Bratton & Masunungure, 2006:35–36; Mlambo, 2008:10). This prompted the government to sanction “Operation Murambatsvina” (trans. Remove the Dirt) – language reminiscent of the Gukurahundi massacres – on 24 May 2005. There was a crackdown on informal spaces in Harare with 30,000 traders arrested or detained and “hundreds of thousands of shanty dwellers” evicted within the first two weeks by the City of Harare Commission (Bratton & Masunungure, 2006:24-8). Initial estimates showed that 70% of residents in 26 high-density wards in Greater Harare lost both shelter and sources of income (Action Aid, 2005, in Bratton & Masunungure, 2006:28). Ordinary Zimbabweans dubbed the clampdown “Operation Murambavanhu” (trans. Operation Anti-People), with 700,000 people losing their homes and six losing their lives at the time of investigation. However, the official government translation was ‘Operation Restore Order’ to legitimise the arbitrarily violent intervention in the area. The contradiction in discernments was clear (Bratton & Masunungure, 2006:21–23; HRW, 2008:11; Tibaijuka, 2005:7, 62). With the MDC calling for a truth and reconciliation commission, the government issued blanket amnesties for perpetrators (Eppel, 2013:226-227; Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:81-83).

Operation Murambatsvina, coupled with dismissals of the MDC’s call for a truth and reconciliation commission in 2006, further tilted civil-military relations towards promoting the interests of securocrats and away from those of citizens (Eppel, 2013:226-227; MDC, 2006; Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:81–88). Pervasive violence and repression during election periods remain concerning. Though Bratton (2016:235) reminds us that ZANU-PF has never respected electoral democracy and has used violence to either intimidate voters or to provide a deterrent to the manipulation of voting outcomes, economic and human capacity-rebuilding remain absent from its agenda in the aftermath of such violence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:32). As Rupiya (2005:118) explains, militarised operations are immune from outside interference and complete their tasks swiftly, whilst viewing impediments – including civilian-based ones – as hostile. When the operation has been completed, perpetrators are immune from retributive justice. This has been the nature of the violence that has shaped gestured TJ efforts in Zimbabwe since 2000 (Bratton, 2016:82).

2.3 'Violence Quotidienne'

Thomson and Jazdowska (2012) conducted a pilot study of grassroots narratives of political violence and justice in Zimbabwe, with data collected from victims of violence from across the country. They found that none of the participants “had gained recompense or a sense of relief from seeing their perpetrators account for what they had done. It [remains] common for perpetrators to still move around freely and continue to appear in their victims’ lives” (p. 93–94). A lack of confidence in traditional judicial processes to deliver justice at an individual level was also noted by a woman participant from a village in Masvingo province:

My heart is full of the spirit of revenge and every time I see any of the boys I see blood. I can’t forgive them for the part they played in the effort to destroy my life. No level of court judgement can adequately redress the destruction and I will never reconcile with the perpetrators. (p. 94)

The authors juxtaposed perceptions of justice against those over amnesties. They cited a survey, conducted by the Harare-based Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), which found that 514 activists who were victims of violence were aware that amnesties may not lead to justice even though they might be “necessary to produc[ing] a lasting political settlement”. Of those interviewed, “few were willing to see serious crimes go unpunished” (RAU, 2009, in Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:91). A Freedom House (2009, in Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:91–92) study further showed variances along partisan lines where 66% of MDC supporters favoured punishment over amnesty, only 38% of ZANU-PF supporters felt the same way.

As displayed, the calls for redress and justice are clear regardless of the demographic or partisan loyalty. Amnesties in this instance must then be viewed as an expression of conceited statehood when authority has been challenged (McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012:414, 432; McEvoy, 2007:421-4). In Zimbabwe, clemencies have been institutionalised and used as scapegoats to confronting accountability and the inherent violence present in the country by elites who still hold power. Likewise, perpetrators who act on behalf of securocrats need not worry about needing a deterrent against proceeding in violence with government assurances behind them (Bratton, 2016:220; Goredema, 2004:105; McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012:422-7). Historically, unlike precolonial African states, amnesties aided in the European state project of amnesia which was viewed as a

precondition for stability and peace in the aftermath of conflict. From a systemic level of analysis, the consequences for such institutionalisation is silencing through commanded forgetfulness and legal amnesia resulting in a denial of justice (Ricœur, 2003:353, in McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012:414).

2.4 The Mnangagwa Era

In the aftermath of the 2018 election, the MDC Alliance claimed to have won the presidential vote. The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe however found that the opposition party failed “to prove this in its electoral petition and the related court hearings, failing to produce sufficient documentation of discrepancies to back up its claims” (Beardsworth et al., 2019:592). This after the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) revised down the margin in which President Mnangagwa won the election from 50.8% to 50.67%. Further doubts of judicial impartiality arose when a civil society call centre, We the People of Zimbabwe (2018, in Beardsworth et al., 2019:591-2), “received thousands of messages from across the country [reporting] a remarkably high number of cases in which voters were ordered to ask for assistance to vote from a known ZANU-PF member or supporter”. The allegations were disregarded by government officials and President Mnangagwa was sworn in on 26 August 2018.

There can be no justice in any form whilst systemic silences and denialisms of collusion prevail. Despite the removal of Mugabe from office, in November 2017, “the disposal of the systemic carcass was going to be a larger task than had been originally conceived” (Ndlovu, 2018). The post-electoral violence that ensued on 1 August 2018 saw the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)’s militarised response kill six civilians and seriously injure fourteen others in Harare’s central business district in full view of international media (Beardsworth et al., 2019:583; Ndlovu, 2018). This was in response to protests “following allegations that the presidential election result was being rigged in favour of ZANU-PF” (Beardsworth et al., 2019:583). Writing on this at the time, I reflected on the legal and militarised responses of the Mnangagwa regime in the days that followed as being reminiscent of the Mugabe era in its efforts to safeguard its authority:

In response to [the events of 1 August 2018], the 2002 Protection of Order and Security Act (POSA), which further limited citizen freedoms, was immediately invoked. Adding to this, the harassment of international media by riot police on 3 August while trying to cover the MDC Alliance's Press Conference highlighted tensions in the aftermath of the announcement of the presidential result. Moreover, on the evening of 3 August, reports emerged of continued army intimidation in high-density suburbs such as Chitungwiza and Kuwadzana. (Ndlovu, 2018)

Prior to the elections, Bratton and Masunungure (2018), in an analysis of Afrobarometer data, found that:

In early May, a slim majority (51%) said they personally feared becoming a victim of electoral intimidation or violence; by early July, a large minority (43%) expressed this concern, an 8-percentage-point drop. This positive shift in the public mood occurred even in the face of a bomb blast at a ZANU-PF election rally at White City Stadium in Bulawayo on June 23. It is reinforced by a growing majority (68%) who thought the current government was performing well at "preventing electoral violence" (up 5 points from 63% in May). (p. 12)

Despite this though, Zimbabweans knew the system with which they were dealing with as over 40% raised concerns over the eruption of violence as they feared armed forces would not respect the citizen's choice (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018a:2). This was with good reason given the president's legacy. Mnangagwa had promised human rights and economic reforms, on 20 December 2017, whilst delivering his first State of the Nation Address as president. Mnangagwa had referred to endemic state-sponsored violence, such as the farm invasions of 2000, as an "albatross around the government's neck" (Sithole-Matarise, 2017). Furthermore, he had promised "zero tolerance" to corruption (Sithole-Matarise, 2017). Mnangagwa – a key architect of the 1982-1987 Gukurahundi Massacres, as well as a plethora of violations in the Mugabe era, and Mugabe's successor after the coup in 2017 – was however stuck between a rock and a hard place as he had to defend his reformist agenda against the actions of his government from 2018 onwards (Bratton, 2016:54; Coltart, 2016:136-156; Matyszak, 2019; Sithole-Matarise, 2017).

History repeated itself in when President Mnangagwa called for a commission of inquiry to investigate the deployment of armed military personnel on civilians in the wake of events in August 2018. Matyszak (2019), however, notes that "key findings of the Motlanthe Commission were based on patently fabricated evidence". A year on in 2019, no further government action nor

national consultations on possibilities on rectificatory justice following the events had occurred (Matyszak, 2019). The secrecy and denialism around accountability by both domestic and regional elites reveals a protectionism that validates clientelist agreements over citizens' lives. This ensures legitimacy within governing elites rather than within the confines of a social contract. In this, advancements in governance is seen solely through the legitimacy, effectiveness and security of the elite (Eppel, 2013; Kriger, 2012).

The current state of affairs remains characterised by “an uneasy political peace” both within the ruling elite and with the ever-declining economic situation (Thomas-Greenfield & Wharton, 2019:15). This has been characterised by pillaged foreign currency reserves; the devaluation of currency because of the introduction of a pseudo-currency, in 2016; inflation; and accumulating national debt. On 8 January 2019, public servants declared incapacitation and gave notice to strike (Alexander & McGregor, 2013; Amnesty International, 2019:5–6; Cotterill, 2019; Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:53; Moore, 2012). Following this, on 12 January 2019, President Mnangagwa announced a fuel hike from “\$1.30 per litre to \$3.11 per litre, an increase of more than 200%” (Raftopoulos, 2019: 12). The president then left for the World Economic Forum in Davos on 13 January 2019 (Amnesty International, 2019:8). The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) then called for a nationwide strike on 14–16 January 2019.

During 14 and 15 January 2019, looting took place across the country. Raftopoulos (2019:21) highlights that “notable in almost all accounts of the looting, [was] the lack of state response”, which raises suspicions of militia involvement. The blame, though, is likely to be placed onto supposed “third forces” (Raftopoulos, 2019:13–21). In addition, widespread rape, abductions, detentions of minors, indiscriminate restrictions on public assembly, unlawful killings and beatings, amongst other violations, ensued (Amnesty International, 2019; Raftopoulos, 2019). The government's attempts at “controlling” dissent included an “unprecedented” total internet shutdown for the duration of the protests. This ended when the High Court ruled the shutdown unlawful on 21 January 2019 (Beardsworth et al., 2019:594; The Guardian, 2019). Closed off from the world, Zimbabweans endured a traumatic crackdown that saw 12 people (officially) killed by security forces and over 600 arrests made in connection to the violence (Amnesty International, 2019: 9). Accountability for these violations, again, remains open to interpretation.

Writing about the events of January 2019, Beardsworth et al. (2019) assert:

violence deployed by the administration in response to the protests and roadblocks was considerably more widespread and severe than in August [2018] and extended to the beating and detention of a wide range of civil society and opposition figures including many who were not responsible. (p. 593–594)

The events of August 2018 and January 2019 raise two questions. First, was the president always insincere in his expressions of support for economic reconstruction, re-engagement with citizens, and political reform? Second, has the president allowed hardliners – particularly General Constantine Chiwenga – to bypass him and inflict violence against his command? (Beardsworth et al., 2019:594; Matyszak, 2019).

President Mnangagwa’s denial of widespread rape by army personnel during the internet shutdown indicts him for violations tantamount to proclamations of warfare⁶ on Zimbabweans. This is buttressed in denying that he issued commands to violence in August 2018 onwards. Under his authority as the president, and commander in chief of the ZDF, in Section 100 (2a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013, he has unwarranted designation to deploy the military (Ayiera, 2010:8; Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013; Raftopolous, 2019:4-6). Beliefs in Mnangagwa’s insincerity are further justified by the abduction and torture of civil society activists, opposition members, and unionists such as medical practitioner Peter Magombeyi. Magombeyi was later found in 40 km out of Harare on the evening of 19 September 2019 being abducted and tortured for demanding an increase in wages for doctors across the country. The government’s continued claim of ignorance in the case is reflective of the regularity of such violent tactics. Despite rumoured tensions within the securocrat elite in 2019, a system of torture and anarchy remains (Mail & Guardian, 2019; Matyszak, 2019; Mokoena, 2019; Reuters, 2019).

To reiterate, these tactics are however not new. As Minister of State for National Security in 1983, Mnangagwa had declared “woe unto those who will choose the path of collaboration with dissidents for we will surely shorten their stay on earth” (The Chronicle, 1983 in Coltart, 2016:134). Where “dissidents” are viewed as those who challenge or force accountability on the ruling party and periphery elites; Mnangagwa has remained consistent to tactics deployed from

1982-1987. Repression in 2019 still involves extrajudicial murders, rapes, detentions, disappearances and other forms of state-sanctioned organised violence and torture clear in the governing strategy of his regime (Amnesty International, 2019).

3. Military and Political Power: The Securocrat Legacy

In 1977, the Joint Operations Command (JOC) was established by the Rhodesian government with the mandate of overseeing military activity within the state (Bratton, 2016:192). As a legacy of this, the JOC controlled “the growth and development of the opposition” post-independence (Matekere & El Moghazy, 2015:269). According to Bratton (2016):

the JOC is a semiformal, nonstatutory body at the apex of the security establishment that represents the joint chiefs of staff. Its membership is composed of the top commanders of the ZDF, AFZ, CIO, ZRP and ZPS. Acting as a sort of war cabinet, the JOC meets weekly to develop strategic responses to national security crises and to recommend action plans to the president. The ministers of defense and state security, and sometimes the chair of the ZNLWVA, also attend regular JOC meetings. (p. 200)

Considering growing opposition in 2000, re-organisation within securitised networks was crucial to working out a militarised plan “to ensure ZANU-PF’s military survival during and after national elections” (Chitiyo, 2009:8). As the “real managers of Zimbabwean politics”, the military elite and their networks became the ruling class of Zimbabwe and showed open allegiance to ZANU-PF (Chitiyo, 2009:8; Matekere & El Moghazy, 2015:270; Tendi, 2013:841). Militarisation did not bestow power on military elites, as the party does not have command of the gun. Rather, the opposite is true (Tendi, 2013:836, 841). Quoting Emmerson Mnangagwa, then Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office, in 1981, Tendi (2013) illustrates the relationship between the military and ZANU-PF:

The agreement under which we got our independence [in 1980] is such that we ceased to propagate the ideology of ZANU in the army. But our army is taught to support the policies of the existing government, which is a ZANU government. Now the policies of the government are the policies of ZANU. (p. 836)

The patron-client relations formed by legacies of the liberation struggle alliances between the ZANU-PF party and the military allowed for the conflation of priorities of the state with those of elite accumulation and benefit. Through the GNU in 2009, the JOC was informalised and the name disbanded. Despite this, military elites have continued to meet in private with ZANU-PF members and run a “parallel government” within the security community that undermines progressive governance (Raftopolous, 2013b:20). Perceived progress is therefore thwarted by advances that prioritise securocrat accumulation of state rents (Chitiyo, 2009:9; Kriger, 2012:12; Moore, 2012:6; Rupiya, 2003; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008).

Though militarised politicisation of the civil space remains concerning in 2019, the ability to command such loyalty across regimes is a phenomenon that can be explained through internal elite structures. The power source of ZANU-PF securocrats lies in the chain of military command, where the commander-in-chief is the superior power, and in the hierarchy of ZANU-PF members and former ZANLA guerrillas. It is this chain of command that allowed Mugabe to gain respect from military elites (Tendi, 2013:837). The retirement of the late General Solomon Mujuru as commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) in 1992, the exiting of Edgar Tekere and Enos Nkala from ZANU-PF in 1988 and 1989 respectively, as well as the death of Maurice Nyagumbo in 1989, left Robert Mugabe as the prominent commanding figure within the party amongst “the emerging generation of service chiefs” (Tendi, 2013:841). Mugabe’s seniority lasted until the end of his tenure as the President of Zimbabwe in 2017. In the post-Mugabe era, though Emmerson Mnangagwa does not rank as highly in liberation credentials as Mugabe did, his roles as the head of state and government and the commander-in-chief of the ZDF accord him the same power, patronage, and access as his predecessor. Mugabe-style militarisation processes under Mnangagwa have been seen where military personnel – such as General Sibusiso Moyo, General Constantine Chiwenga, and General Philip Valerio Sibanda – were formerly retired out of service to become the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Vice President, and the Commander of the ZDF respectively (Moore, 2018c:11–12; Tendi, 2013:837–841).

Whilst examining militarisation, Mugabe’s unique intellectual and strategic prowess in navigating the asymmetric dynamic within patron-client relations must be noted. He could tactfully “play rivals and threats one against the other” and manipulate his political legitimacy (Doran, 2017:644).

Though his enigmatic, non-reactionary persona often gained him respect with the patron-client elite that surrounded him, his “insatiable greed and gluttony” for power and control fuelled neopatrimonialism in Zimbabwe (Mkandawire, 2015:572; Norman, 2008). Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2015) notion of “Mugabeism” explains that the persona of Mugabe was synonymous with the institutions that governed Zimbabwe as well as their systemic legacies. His era may have ended but the system set up by Mugabeism has not. Moore (2018b) notes:

it is harder to imagine that the incumbent president, Emmerson [Dambudzo] Mnangagwa, will be able to balance Zimbabwe’s many mutually antagonistic forces for long beyond Mugabe. Indeed, it was Mugabe’s own attempts to use these forces to his advantage that led to his downfall – eventually. (p. 265)

The institutionalisation of systemic Mugabeism is, thus, not sustainable for more than a generation without the person that the system mirrored at the helm of power (Moore, 2018b; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). Despite having worked closely with Mugabe for over four decades, Mnangagwa must redefine his power politics either by descending further into the established system and revealing new avenues for neopatrimonialism or by working to reorientate it to suit his interests. Vis-à-vis his relationship with the military, as it stood in 2019, Beardsworth et al. (2019) note:

while the army has at times operated independently from civilian authorities, Mnangagwa has a complex relationship with the institution that allows him considerable leverage. It is now clear, for example, that despite initial rumours to the contrary, it was the president himself who ordered soldiers on to the streets of Harare in 2018 and not army leaders operating under their own steam. This suggests that Mnangagwa is more powerful than he is sometimes depicted as being by those who see him as a frustrated reformer trapped in a restrictive system. (p. 595)

This analysis suggests that Mnangagwa remains committed to further entrenching the politics of patronage for the benefit of the ruling elite – i.e. to the status quo. Cheeseman and Tendi (2010, in Kriger, 2012:1) refer to this tenet of ZANU-PF securocrats and their allies as the “politics of continuity”. People perpetuate these systems. Therefore, the networks that maintain executive power are important to examine.

3.1 Elites and Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations refers to the established and interdependent relationship between state security agents and their supportive institutions in a given society (Ebo, 2005:2, in Matekere & El Moghazy, 2015:250; Huntington & Goodpaster, 1977:31, in Rupiya, 2003:252–253). The relations themselves are to be understood through the broad “professional, political, social and economic” roles of the military (Moyo, 2015:162). Within this understanding, there remains objective and subjective control by the military and its supporting institutions. Where objective control is highlighted, there is a separation of powers between military and civilian institutions. In Zimbabwe, where subjective control is concerned, “patronage-based military control is a norm” and the “distinction between the government and the army has been lost” (Moyo, 2015: 163). Moyo (2015: 164) highlights that under Zimbabwean law, military personnel cannot participate in politics other than to exercise their democratic right to vote. The history and reality of elite survival and sources of power has, however, “firmly entrenched [the] executive control of the military” in the political sphere (Moyo, 2015: 164). Buttressing this, Rupiya (2003:251–252) argues that the political settlements that formed Zimbabwe’s politico-military institutions were highly competitive between ZANU and ZAPU nationalists. Reliance on military strength in nationalist contestations for dominance has been evident in political, economic, and military spaces, with each nationalist grouping having “created [its] own military wing and ... [used] this arm to advance political objectives” (Rupiya, 2003:252). This liberation movement model of civil-military relations, which highlights the asymmetric politics of domination, has remained a means of understanding societal problems within a revolutionary war context for the ruling elite. This is recognisable through the dismantling of ZAPU – a then fellow militarised elite – as a viable contender with securitised power (Moyo, 2015:161; Rupiya, 2003:252).

Ideally, stability is realised when dominance allays the apprehensions of the dominated (Di John & Putzel, 2009:4, 45; Rupiya, 2003:252). Stability can be measured by political cultures, through its exercise in varying degrees through democratic processes; surveillance; social protections; conflict resolution processes; decentralisation; as well as demilitarisation of administrative power amongst bargaining elites (Huntington & Goodpaster, 1977:31, in Rupiya, 2003:252–253). Khan (2010:57), however, cautions that consensus amongst bargaining elites is rare. As such, internal and external clashes amongst political actors arise when “the triad [of] the security sector,

government and other sectors of society” (Rupiya, 2003:252) compete within the state against various ideologies.

Political settlements are tools for elites to reshape institutions in their own interests (Parks & Cole, 2010:6). Despite the need to relinquish some control to reach a settlement, ZANU-PF has persistently retained control (Di John & Putzel, 2009:45; Diamond, 1999:163; Walter, 1999:137). Albeit assumed mutual understandings of the conditions of the independence settlement with ZANU by ZAPU; neither ZANU nor ZAPU felt sure of security through power in 1979 at Lancaster House. The paradox lay in a failed balance of the interests of bargaining elites towards relinquishing power to form a new administrative corps whilst retaining a semblance of security and trust for each other (Nkomo, 1984; Coltart, 2016).

Despite the dissolution of the JOC in 2008, the JOC remains subservient to ZANU-PF under the control of the president as the head of ZANU-PF. This whilst technocrat and civilian led efforts to transition Zimbabwe out of a militarised state continue to face reproach (Chitiyo, 2009:8-9; ICG, 2010:4; Mutisi, 2011; Tendi, 2013:836). Echoing Rupiya’s (2003) inference that the ruling ZANU-PF elite continues to inflict militarised solutions on civic socio-political and economic issues, Dendere (2018: 378) observes that military interference in Zimbabwe has never been “motivated by the need to find solutions to the twin economic and political crisis”. Likewise, reflexive analysis on ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ in 2019 reveals that the securocrats that aided the ascension of the Mnangagwa regime have been successful in their operational mandate to interfere in the politics to safeguard their interests (Moore, 2018a; Mudau & Mangani, 2018:179; Ndlovu, 2018; Tendi, 2020:40). This is further testament to the engrained nature of militarisation within the Zimbabwean state. Even in 2019, the state of Zimbabwean civil-military relations is reflective of the omnipresent militarised operations in the country (Tendi, 2020). Political settlements that were perceived as moments of transition out of oppressive regimes in Zimbabwe over three decades simply acted as engines that reproduced securitisation, clientelism and violent accumulation.

4. Denial and Trauma

The removal of Mugabe as the face of tyranny was not the overhauling of the system (Cameron, 2017; Thomas-Greenfield & Wharton, 2019:8-13). Pervasive cultures of denialism at all levels of societal engagement in Zimbabwe make it difficult to extrapolate truth and subsequent justice. Whether literal, interpretive or implicative, denial takes shape in either “moral indifference” or the “denial of knowledge” (Cohen, 2001:77; Cohen, 1996:522). Also, within these denialisms, silence may be perceived as “passivity, loyalty or pragmatism” (Lawther, 2013, in Tarusarira, 2019:221). Hamm (2002) defines denialism:

as an unconscious defense mechanism for coping with guilt, anxiety and other disturbing emotions aroused by reality. The psyche blocks off information that is literally unthinkable or unbearable. The unconscious sets up a barrier which prevents the thought from reaching conscious knowledge. Information and memories slip into an inaccessible region of the mind. (p. 178)

In the first instance, the denial for atrocities by the accused as they did not commit the offence. This is the literal aspect of denial. Second, there may be interpretive denialism of known truths through intentional duplicity by perpetrators (Cohen, 1996:522). Such denialism manifests in deceit, concealment or even lying to oneself or one’s administration. Such interpretive denials to which Cohen (1996:522) refers are key to the sustenance of patron-client relations in securing their accumulative benefits. Here, ignorance is also used to silence moral responsibilities towards truth-seeking and accountability towards non-resurgence of violence (Cohen, 2001). Third, implicative denial is then when perpetration is supposedly justified (Cohen, 1996:522). Here, counter-narratives that go against projected narratives by elites categorise whistle-blowers and anti-patronage activists as traitors (Cohen, 1996:535). In this, Hirschman (1970:30–4) and Lawther (2013:169, in Tarusarira, 2019:221) unpack this form of denial as “unconscious loyalism” and silence through “loyalty” of insider actors to a system respectively.

Silence, as a form of denial, occurs at both state and individual levels in a bid to subconsciously compartmentalise traumatic events through granting amnesties to perpetrators and the denial of justice to victims. In Zimbabwe, silence manifesting through impunities remains particularly problematic for those who fall outside privileged protections of the ruling elite. This remains as a

major obstacle for TJ (Amnesty International, 2002; Bratton, 2016; CCJP, 1997; Coltart, 2016; Moore, 1991). The form of denial where the truth is unknown in the public realm is particularly dangerous as broader societal indifference cement hatred between belligerents and foster asymmetric power politics. This form of denial can be interpreted as silence through passivity where knowledge exists in the absence of reaction (Lawther, 2013:169, in Tarusarira, 2019:221). In Zimbabwe, this is particularly true where citizens suffer perpetration and the hands of periphery state security networks and prospects for justice, public acknowledgement and accountability are unlikely. Likewise buttressed by instances when neighbouring countries and communities are captured by the dictates of ideological loyalties and power politics that necessitate their own legitimacy. This was exemplified by the porous South African mediation of the GPA (Cohen, 2001; Hirsch, 2008:106; Mutisi, 2011:4).

At the individual level, silences manifest in varying memories of traumatic events retained interpretive denials of communal narratives and memories of historical perpetration. Pickering and Keightley (2009:238) note that trauma, as a fluid concept, references “the severe difficulty of coming to terms with a shocking or painful event or an enduring series of such events in an individual’s experience, along with the consequences of this in someone’s subsequent life”. Both historical and structural trauma exist, and TJ efforts must tackle both, as well as the complexities at their various intersections. Historical trauma as the primary instance of violation is experienced by individuals and communities but is always internalised individually (LaCapra, 1999:721-2). Given this, some people may choose to practice pragmatic silence as “a deliberate choice to...truncate conflict over the meaning or justification of past violence” (Lawther, 2013, in Tarusarira, 2019:221). The structural element of historicised trauma is the subsequent socialisation of this into society (LaCapra, 1999:725). The existence of various narratives of perpetration are often ‘mythicised’ a coping mechanism for humanity in the aftermath of violent clashes where national cultures and narratives of truth and acknowledgement absent. This unfortunately keeps prospects of further perpetration alive through reliving past violations thus inducing fear (LaCapra, 1999:721-7; Ndlovu, 2019). This psychoanalytical level of analysis is important to note in seeking to understand civilian apathy and the effects of endemic trauma in the light of endemic societal violence – both physical and systemic – in Zimbabwe. Denialism or deliberate amnesia towards

traumatic events remains transferrable as political cultures allow (Cohen, 1996, 2001; LaCapra, 1999; Ndlovu, 2019:215).

Moyo (2019b:24) notes that transitional justice breeds accountability and “[a]ccountability ... deters the new regime from complacently violating human rights norms”. Contrary to Moyo’s assertion, known evidence of perpetration and prospects of accountability have proven to not deter new regimes in Zimbabwe. In fact, President Mnangagwa himself remains accountable to much – from the Gukurahundi massacres to his involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Marange diamond trade routes which shall be addressed in Chapters IV (1.1) and (1.2) – yet continues to answer to very little (Bratton, 2016:54; Chitiyo, 2009; Coltart, 2016:136-56; Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:58; Kriger, 2012:19-23). Citizens then self-preserve by repressing such memories to avoid violent state-sponsored backlash (Ndlovu, 2019:228-32; Tarusira, 2019:221). This makes healing intervention processes difficult, as narratives are often reimagined and some perpetrators omitted.

There are however the dangers in repressing memory. Trauma manifested in various degrees of mental illness that may affect how facts of violation are remembered (Pickering & Keightley, 2009:238). This is the state of victims of the Zimbabwean state’s violations, who have not been afforded justice after perpetration. Generational legacies of politicised denial are not enough to mask societal knowledge of violent occurrences in Zimbabwe as tangible evidence of perpetration will always exist. Writing on Gukurahundi, Ndlovu (2019) reminds us that:

[d]espite state denial the presence of witnesses, mass graves, the resurgence of written reports since the late 1990s, and medical reports archived from the 1980s, have all provided much needed evidence of [endemic violent occurrences]. (p. 147)

Due to the pervasive and cyclical nature of violence in Zimbabwe, many silenced perpetrations are unpacked decades after the act. TJ efforts that attempt to redress perpetration retrospectively face two issues. First, there are statutes of limitation for retribution under the domestic criminal justice system in Zimbabwe. This inhibits trial in domestic courts after a certain period. Thus, justice evades many cases, as many people – especially in rural areas – remain unaware of the timeframes, locations, and processes vis-à-vis the reporting of violations. Some, even with the information, do

not feel safe enough to approach the court run by the government which violated them, nor to go to their village chiefs, who are often passive in ZANU-PF rural mobilisation initiatives (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:756; Kriger, 2012:18). Second, the historical facts surrounding a traumatic event may be forgotten or distorted over a prolonged period (Jelin, 2003:56, 87; LaCapra, 2001:1, and Jelin, 2003:48, in Ndlovu, 2019:130).

Given state denialisms and subversion of voice to victims and survivors, the burden of proof continues to rest on the perpetrated unless their incident(s) have been documented and stored outside state institutions. This is particularly difficult when the government is the same ruthless abuser of institutions that are meant to develop a country (Mani, 2008 in Eppel 2013:221). As this burden is costly, reawakening of past traumas and oft life-threatening given the current state of the nation, many of those perpetrated who would have benefitted from previous state-funded projects and national dialogues are excluded from the healing process. This is true especially when the claimant for justice belongs to the next generation (Eppel, 2013:224-6; Hirsch, 2008).

The psychological merits of transitional justice processes are critical in societies such as Zimbabwe where sites of perpetration remain unaddressed and perpetrators continue to control governance narratives. Much needed recognition of perpetration and redress must still occur. As Tarusarira (2019:223) asserts, “[s]ilence and denial are...direct affronts to knowledge and acknowledgement”. The latter remain important for the consolidation of a national metanarrative which paints clear understandings of the past (Ndlovu, 2019:241-4). This is, unfortunately, yet to occur.

CHAPTER IV

1. Framing Militarisation

Elite hesitance to allow for national healing efforts are problematically entrenched in the need to preserve securocrats and their allies in government and industry. Accountability through transparency is therefore not an option (Bratton, 2016:221, 227-8; Eppel, 2013:212-4; Khan, 2005; Magure, 2012; Moore, 2012). Securocrats remain vested in keeping ZANU-PF in power to maintain the legacies of patron-client relations to this end (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758; Chitiyo, 2009:7; Kriger, 2003:198; Kriger, 2012:13; Magaisa, 2019a; Sachikonye, 2011:22-3). This chapter examines the processes and legacies of access and accumulation which have resulted in a rejected consociational governance that would bargain for better power-sharing, democracy, and deterrence of violence (Andeweg, 2000; Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:127–128). Though this type of governance is, generally speaking, preferred in transitioning from conflict and preventing a resurgence of grievances that might lead to violence, the power politics of the civil-military elite in Zimbabwe have favoured unipolar configurations. Inevitably, these top-down system-wide approaches have resulted in a lack of reform of state institutions towards effectiveness – more so, in an unwillingness to embark on transformative efforts (Kelsall, 2016, 2018; Sithole, 1988). Brown and Ní Aoláin (2014:128) note that this is representative of the type of “political power that enables client[e]lism, resilience and the intensification of traditional identities and militant expressionism”, as it enables a lack of reform and transformation within critical state institutions.

The legacy of the liberation struggle forms the product of the current state, characterised by patron-client relations through its institutions and alliances. The state and its aligned networks have consistently prioritised these alliances to preserve the ruling elite. A defining result has been the militarisation of the state. The 1982–1987 Gukurahundi massacres serve as an early indication of the extent to which the post-independence state, run by the liberation struggle elite, was to engage with securitisation as a form of political preservation and opposition elimination (Coltart, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). As a characteristic of the state, “Zimbabwe’s politics was militarised, and military coercion became the currency of politics” (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005:359). According to Alexander (2013:811), the post-1997 period is a legitimisation of the widespread militarisation.

The subsequent escalation of violence in the post-2000 period – cited in the work of scholars such as Rupiya and Chitiyo (2005), Eppel (2013), Dawson & Kelsall (2013:58), and Tendi (2013, 2016) – is also testament to this.

Alexander (2013:811–3) identifies four key processes that led to the militarisation of Zimbabwean society that will form the foundations of the discussion in this chapter. First, she notes that militarisation “encompassed the decisive intervention of the military qua military and as part of the state in electoral politics” (Alexander, 2013:811–2). According to Alexander (2013:811–2), this was demonstrated most intensely in the 2008 electoral period. From 2004 onwards, President Mugabe made appointments from the security community to run electoral institutions such as the ZEC and the Delimitation Commission. Notable in this regard was the appointment of Retired Major General George Chiweshe – a former Judge Advocate in the ZNA and High Court Judge – as Chair of the ZEC. The results, as seen in 2008, included a discredited election outcome that resulted in widespread post-electoral violence (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2011:9). The validation of these appointments was supported by processes that preceded it, as seen in the eventual saturation of “serving and retired military officers [in] state posts” (Tendi, 2013:841). This initial process is what Tendi (2013:841) defines as militarisation, but is only a part of the overall process according to Alexander (2013:811–3).

If not institutionalised, aspirations towards access to power become personalised (van de Welle, 2001:117). The personalisation of power is seen through elite clientelism which is practiced by the head of government who has “personal access to resources” (Tendi, 2013:841). The performance of militarism for self-preservation is a form of clientelism, as patrons give patronage, tributes and prebends to appease clients. Where prebendalism is concerned, clients believe they are entitled to make “personal use of state resources” often as perceived payment for loyalty or “sacrifices during the liberation war” (Tendi, 2013:841, see also, Khan, 2005:11). The incentive to remain loyal comes from benefits accorded to clients through access to privileged state positions and resources (Tendi, 2013:841). Patron-client relations in Zimbabwe have allowed for an endemic culture of prebendalism – as an extension of patronage that is predisposed to entitlement – to fester amongst all with access to disrupting ZANU-PF legitimacy within and beyond militarised allegiances (Behuria et al., 2017:512; Khan, 2010:64–5; Tendi, 2013:841-2; van de Welle, 2001:51-3).

Neopatrimonialism has been at the core of Zimbabwe's political economics for over three decades. This characterises the second aspect of Alexander's (2013) processes of militarisation as:

the entrance of military men (former and serving, in and outside the state and party) into lucrative networks of accumulation and patronage, ranging from the award of government contracts and tenders to businesses owned by military and party leaders to more direct control of production and trade. These practices have a long history rooted in the 1970s, but the 1997 military intervention in the DRC marked a new watershed, while the involvement of the security forces in Zimbabwe's massive diamond fields from 2006 "cemented" their "role as the dominant class in Zimbabwe's business community. (p. 812)

Over the years, accumulation has taken many forms however securocrats remain as constant beneficiaries. The Willowgate Scandal of 1989 was the first real publication of the corruption rife within government and the ruling ZANU-PF party. "[S]enior military, government and ZANU-PF party officials purchased Toyota Cressida cars at a government controlled price of Z\$27,000 and resold them on the black market" at a 200% profit (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015:187). The scandal forced senior members of ZANU-PF such as Enos Nkala, Maurice Nyagumbo and Frederick Shava – Ministers of Defense, Political Affairs and State for Political Affairs respectively – to resign from the party and government in 1990. Resultantly, the Sandura Commission was set up to investigate the incident and subsequent resignations by those involved. Despite this however, the reporters who had broken the story were removed from their posts thus reflecting state control on the reporting of prebends and patronage. This was to mark the beginning of a long series of patron-client exchanges that shape Zimbabwe as a neopatrimonial state (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015:187-8; Perlez, 1989; Tendi, 2013:840).

Alexander highlights a third part of the militarisation process as the "posting of liberation war veterans and others with strong links to ZANU(PF) from senior ranks in the military to senior positions in state and parastatal institutions [as processes to] build and discipline a partisan state" (Alexander, 2013: 811). President Robert Mugabe and his successor, President Emmerson Mnangagwa, have made continuing appointments to state parastatals such as the CIO, the diplomatic corps, and media services, as well as to other influential state positions, to safeguard their interests and those of their networks, rather than the public (Alexander, 2013:811–812; Chitiyo, 2009:9; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2011:9, 21–25; Eppel, 2013). The interdependence

with, and loyalism to, the centralised power of the executive was further highlighted when Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba, former chairman of the National Railways of Zimbabwe, publically acknowledged the military's preference for elections to be held in 2011, rather than 2013, and for Mugabe "to win those elections" on 27 May 2011 (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2011:26). On 23 June 2011, Nyikayaramba referred to Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai as a "security threat" (The Herald, 2001, in Bratton, 2016:202). The securocrat's public slander of a civilian leader later awarded him a promotion from President Mugabe (Bratton, 2016:209). Tendi (2013) also depicts military elites' partisan alignment with ZANU-PF and Mugabe whilst quoting an interview conducted with an unnamed military general – referred to as "General B" – in 2011:

the system which has sustained us is that the party commands the gun. Baba ava garwi nhaka vari vapenyu. Akuna zuwa rino buda rimwe riripo. Hanti uri kuzvinzwa? [Translation: the father or ZANU PF cannot be replaced. You cannot inherit a living father's throne. Two suns will never rise simultaneously. Do you understand me?]. (p. 837)

Prospects of preserving democracy and strategising development waver when there are such robust displays of neopatrimonialism (Diamond, 1999; van de Walle, 2001:51–53). Mkandawire (2015:571) provides valuable insight in noting that such neopatrimonial cultures are perpetuated by "untoward deference to authority" shown by clients and owed to an "economy of affection ... which lends normalcy to corruption" and subsequent prebendalism. As Moyo (2016:351) argues, "military officials have little background in macroeconomic policy or the professional ethos required for making [state enterprises and parastatals] deliver on their social and economic mandates". The militarisation of Zimbabwe's political arena remains problematic, as "a state that relies on military apparatuses to gain the consent of the citizenry cannot nurture a [progressive] ethos" (Matekere & El Moghazy, 2015:252). Likewise, the preserved status quo around the centralisation of power within the executive allows the military elite to benefit from socio-economic as well as political benefits, serving to protect the president's as well as the ruling party's legitimacy (Matekere & El Moghazy, 2015:262). To buttress this, in the aftermath of the 2008 post-electoral violence, General Martin Chedondo reaffirmed the mandate expressed by "General B" whilst noting that "soldiers are not apolitical" (BBC News, 2008; Tendi, 2013:837). The

presence of the security community in civic affairs is one of the key challenges in thwarting militarisation.

In Zimbabwe, tensions in civil-military relations are evident in what Alexander (2013) cites as the final process of militarisation, which:

constitute[s] a style of governance, most clearly embodied in the “operation”. As such, it was at odds with the bureaucratic state (and the ethics of a professional military) even if it at the same time invoked ideas of order associated with it. (p. 812)

From 1980 onwards, such tactics were employed. Operation Quartz, set in motion by the Rhodesian military, was a last attempt at clinging to power in 1980. The Rhodesians sought to kill liberation nationalist guerrillas, as well as assassinate Mugabe and other nationalists, to thwart a Patriotic Front victory in March 1980 that would ensure Black majority rule (Kriger, 2003:25–66; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:4).

The legacy of this aspiration to a militarised style of governance has been seen in a series of ZANU-PF operations, in which counter-offensive measures against perceived “threats” to ruling elite hegemonies have been employed. These include: the Gukurahundi massacres of 1982–1987; operations in the Congo in 1997–1998; the farm invasions of 2000; Operations Murambatsvina and Operation Taguta in 2005; Operation Reduce Prices in 2007; Operations Makavhoterapapi, Chikoroza Chapera, and Hakudzokwi in 2008; as well as Operation Restore Legacy, in 2017, which ushered in the Mnangagwa regime (Alexander & McGregor, 2013; Amnesty International, 2019; Bratton, 2016:82; CCJP, 1997; Chitiyo, 2009; Eppel, 2013; HRW, 2008; Kriger, 2003, 2012; Magaisa, 2019a; Sachikonye, 2011; Tendi, 2020; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008). These operations:

circumvented, challenged and transformed state institutions that were capable, expert and largely if not entirely viewed as legitimate. The judiciary and the ministries concerned with local government and lands were initially targeted. Later operations made more specific interventions and engaged a transformed state in that work. Many operations offered opportunities for “looting” and patronage. They were used to intervene in a remarkable range of realms, including land tenure, urban and rural livelihoods, political freedoms, and the distribution and consumption of goods ranging from food to

agricultural inputs to housing to diamonds. They were a central means by which an alternative kind of power to that of the bureaucratic state institution was constructed. (Alexander, 2013:812)

For the ruling ZANU-PF, the ideological shift from nationalism to elite protectionism saw an increase in the involvement of the security arm of the state in the control of institutions (Bratton, 2016:200). This began, in 2000, with Operation Tsuru, which “involved approximately 1,500 war veterans, 1,000 soldiers of the 5th Brigade, 300 CIO operatives, approximately 200 members of the police, and 5-6,000 ZANU-PF volunteers, including ZANU-PF youth members” (Chitiyo, 2009:4). Directed by the JOC, its aim was to forcibly take over white-owned commercial farms and to incite violence, arson, and murder against opposition members to ensure votes for ZANU-PF through intimidation. Though the police initially tried to stop the militias, the operation carried on, as it was sanctioned by senior securocrats linked to the executive (Chitiyo, 2009:4).

Noting a military operation as a governance method of last resort, Rupiya (2005:117) cites its enactment as a failure of the normative functions of state bureaucracy in most democracies (Rupiya, 2005:117). For Operation Tsuru, a “command-and-control” culture that reintegrated the JOC into the state to deal with various crises was key to ZANU-PF control. Operational zones, which identified as enemies those who were opposed to the elite agenda and as allies those who were for ZANU-PF, were also established. Finally, the framing of Operation Tsuru and its legacies has employed methods of violence and subversion of citizens by securitised actors within the ZANU-PF corps, to invoke fear and apathy whilst asserting power and control (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005:359–360).

A military operation, whilst adhering to strict timelines, is generally unsustainable given the “rapid deterioration of its utility” (Rupiya, 2005:118). Military-style operations perpetuate asymmetric civil-military relations, which is to the satisfaction of those leading interventions. These considerations further buttress the notion that under the control of securocrats, Zimbabwe remains a military operational zone, thus allowing the survival of ZANU-PF (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005:359; Rupiya, 2005:118). Essentially, this is the political continuity of civil-military relations in Zimbabwe favouring the ruling elite, supported by a neopatrimonial state (Alexander, 2013: 812;

Alexander & McGregor, 2013:753; Chitiyo, 2009:4–11; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009; Moyo, 2015; Tendi, 2013; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008).

2. Accruing Benefits Through Networks of Survival

Parallel to the deepening economic crisis in recent times, Zimbabwe has seen continued woes through the accumulation of resources by securocrats and their clients. Kriger (2012) gives a holistic overview of the intricate elite networks which sustain ZANU-PF. She notes that the party's "competition with the 'opposition' parties...helps informal networks to cohere sufficiently to run a parallel government that effectively sabotages" progressive efforts between the ruling party and periphery actors such as the opposition, civil society and the citizens themselves (Kriger, 2012:12). McGregor (2013) problematises this approach in a rebuttal, which notes "'parallel' [as] a misleading metaphor because ZANU(PF) powers work within as well as outside state institutions, while 'network' removes hierarchy. 'Informal' can imply disorganisation, marginality and a separation from the realm of state" (McGregor, 2013:786–787). However, her criticism on a point of semantics is misguided, as the "parallel governments" works alongside ZANU-PF agendas and "networks" to maintain the existing hierarchy (Raftopoulos, 2013b: 20). This by no means informalises their impact nor their execution. As Khan (2010) notes:

operation of formal institutions can depend on informal institutions, and these interdependencies turn out to be very important. Institutions are *informal* when there are no formal rules written down and enforced by formal (state) enforcement, but there are nevertheless "rules" that are systematic enough to be identified. (p. 10)

The "informality" of institutions is thus varied. Internalised values and norms may form the basis of internal informal networks that seek to support the operations of formalised institutions (Khan, 2010:10). "Informality" in this instance is termed only as an irregular channel of operation and accumulation for elite interest. Informal patron-client networks are often of people with positions in state institutions, the party, and other influential positions, who make resource extraction by ZANU-PF elites and those aligned to them easier (Kriger, 2012:11).

The benefits of such neopatrimonialism were seen in the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development's ability to pay civil servants a US\$ 40 million increase in July 2011 – a duty outside its mandate – by retaining mining revenues and not submitting them to the Reserve Bank as per usual procedure (Kriger, 2012:16). This comes as then Minister Obert Mpofu had once referred to himself as Mugabe's "ever obedient son" (News Day, 2010). Salary increases which constituted one-third of the Treasury's monthly wage bill were authorised, despite civil servants already consuming 63% of the government's annual budget. Additionally, the ministry did not account for 90% of diamond revenue by November 2011, despite calls from the Ministry of Finance (Kriger, 2012:16). According to Kriger (2012:15), by 2008, "almost 40% of civil servants [were] youth militia [who had been] hired irregularly" by ZANU-PF. This example is indicative of the increased degree of party control of state institutions exercised by alliances in the security sector, government, traditional leaders, as well as other strategic actors (Kriger, 2012:13).

In view of this evidence, McGregor's (2013:787) calls for semantic clarity and her argument that the "conflation [of the state with ZANU-PF] is a prime object of political contestation", are a deflection from the problem of incessant neopatrimonialism at hand, whilst the visibility and influence of the Zimbabwean military continues to grow within the bureaucratic state (Moyo, 2015:160). The boundaries that McGregor proposes continue to be blurred not only within the networks that support elite rule, but also regarding client access to the country's resources (Alexander, 2013:811–812; Kriger, 2012:12).

This process was however contested not only by civilian technocrats, but historically by professional cadres who were opposed to the conflation of professional military duty and the governance of state institutions (Alexander, 2013:811; Tendi, 2013). Tendi (2016:205) warns that analysis on militarisation must not blindly assert "a façade of inflexible loyalism to Mugabe" within ZANU-PF and the military elite during his rule. Though he was the commander-in-chief of the ZDF, there were factions within ZANU-PF who spoke out against ill-governance. ZANLA liberation stalwarts, such as Josiah Tongogara and Edgar Tekere, grew critical of growing corruption under Mugabe's regime and of efforts to create a one-party state under ZANU-PF. As later confirmed by Retired General Constantine Chiwenga (AllAfrica, 2017) and former ZIPRA intelligence chief Dumiso Dabengwa (New Zimbabwe, 2018), Tongogara was murdered shortly

after the ceasefire on 26 December 1979 for supporting Joshua Nkomo for the presidency and predicting Mugabe's rule as a "total disaster". Tekere, who was expelled from the ruling party in 1988, ran for presidential office under the banner of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), but he failed to secure the majority vote (Tendi, 2013:838–840; Tendi, 2016:203).

As noted earlier, a culture of maintaining the status quo is endemic within the Zimbabwean ruling elite, as they continue to benefit from regulating extractive state institutions. The politics of continuity impede interventions that could result in a loss of ZANU-PF power (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010, in Kriger, 2012:12; Mkandawire, 2015:571). As such, despite the MDC entering the political executive arena through the GNU in 2008, ZANU-PF party political agendas always took precedence over national development ones (Kriger, 2012:12; Matyszak & Reeler, 2011). The ruling elite's ability to perform the politics of continuity despite such structural governmental shifts displays the strength, control, and interconnectedness of the ZANU-PF network. It is characterised by ZANU-PF's consistent navigation of state, security, society, and economy in governmental responses to various crises (Kriger, 2012:12). An integral part of maintaining this network is surveillance.

2.1 Surveillance by, and within, networks

Surveillance in Zimbabwe is two-fold. First, as McGregor (2013: 783) argues "surveillance [is] central to ZANU(PF)'s strategy for urban control and to the politics of patronage". Second, surveillance is to be understood through Tendi's (2016) analysis of gendered surveillance of the elite from within. In other words, the extensive reach of state control and the maintenance of networks of accumulation are seen through the centralisation of power – which relies on surveillance.

Militarised networks survive on secrecy. Information is meticulously collected through surveillance and tightly controlled for the (ab)use of ruling elites (de Waal, 2002a:75). McGregor outlines surveillance as "close observation, especially of a suspected spy or criminal", [which] can achieve control in a manner that is distinct from coercion through force and threats" (Oxford

Dictionaries, 2013, in McGregor, 2013:785). Dependent on centralised institutions within the state, this remains a more “subtle” way of controlling state narratives and monitoring citizens than overt coercion (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:753). The state of surveillance is formed through elite projections of “suspicion, distrust and fear” (Purdekova, 2011, in McGregor, 2013:786). In Zimbabwe, one of its manifestations was the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which banned foreign correspondents and required journalists to register with the government (Bratton, 2016:77). Dense administrative bureaucracies with close linkages to the military elite are another characteristic of surveillance states (McGregor, 2013:785). According to Chitiyo (2009:12), the CIO – the state’s primary civilian intelligence institution – had 10,000 permanent personnel in 2009. He further notes:

The CIO is notorious for abductions and the use of torture to extract information. Although the CIO is funded by taxpayers’ money, it is awarded through nonpublic President’s Office funds, making it difficult to determine the CIO’s annual budget and expenditure. Nevertheless, salaries remain an issue for the CIO rank and file. As part of the President’s Office, the organisation has access to funds that are not readily available to other military sectors. CIO operatives wield considerable “private” power. (Chitiyo, 2009:12)

The legacies of this, however, pre-date independence. Rhodesia’s legacy of surveillance and “centralised state bureaucracies, which were notable for their capacity for repression alongside their developmental ambition” continues to haunt Zimbabwe (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:751). Even in 2019, surveillance not only forms part of the state apparatus to subvert voices that oppose government policies, but formalises partisan regulation or citizen apathy through violence and coercion (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:757–758). This is illustrated by the previously mentioned example of Peter Magombeyi’s ordeal in September 2019. The incentive from higher-ranking officials is expressed through patronage to these clients – or at least to those in higher command who order the foot soldiers. McGregor (2013:792) notes that some positions, such as that of councillor, were once a way to access power and accumulate wealth. In the wake of the GNU, this culture spilt over into the MDC as well. Citing developments within Tsvangirai’s (MDC-T) faction, McGregor (2013:791) highlights that “MDC-T Provincial structures estimated that 70% of the MDC-T councillors in Harare and Chitungwiza were unemployed and did not own their own homes prior to being elected as councillor”. Not only was this corruptibility through a culture of

clientelism problematic, it reflected a wider systemic crisis in government in which poverty and lack of education made people vulnerable to being corrupted. Unconscious loyalism through deference to authority “cannot give rise to [a fair-minded] voice” as it becomes a form of survival rather than service (Hirschman, 1970:93, see also, Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758; Mkandawire, 2015:571-2).

The narrative is different for those who are not beneficiaries of patron-client relations. Samantha Kureya’s ordeal on the evening of 21 August 2019 is testament to this. Samantha, a Zimbabwean satirist whose stage name is *Gonyeti* was abducted from her home by three masked men carrying guns and tortured. Notwithstanding her ordeal, in 2016, Kureya had been a police spokesperson denying circulating reports of police brutality towards citizens (Allison, 2019). For securocrats and their clients, loyalty is subject to their value addition to the specific elite agenda at the time. Those who oppose an agenda – even though they once supported it – are similarly subject to the militarised arm of the state. In 2017, this was also seen in the neutralisation of the ability of key branches of the security community – i.e. the CIO and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) – to act against Operation Restore Legacy, which saw the end of Mugabe’s rule. The neutralisation was vital to the operation’s successful installation of the Mnangagwa regime (Tendi, 2020:40; Thomas-Greenfield & Wharton, 2019:12). As Tendi (2019:8) notes, “[s]oldiers seized control of the ZRP’s Chikurubi armoury and systematically rounded up CIO operatives in order to disarm them”. The fluidity of subversion and surveillance must, therefore, be recognised.

Surveillance also occurs within the elite spaces where conscious loyalism is present (Chitiyo, 2009; Hirschman, 1970; Tendi, 2013, 2016, 2019). A key aspect of internal surveillance is seen in succession politics within ZANU-PF. Notwithstanding Sachikonye’s (2011:33) assertion that intra-party violence in ZANU-PF was “not lethal” and “not as vicious” as that unleashed on the opposition, the structural gendered violence generated as an outcome of surveillance tells a different story. Militarism and the cultures sustained in militarised masculinities reproduce societies that are far from being considered gender-neutral (Clarke, 2008:63; de Waal, 2002a:77). Hypermasculine notions of militarism normalise the sexualisation of women in positions of political prominence as an argument for their inclusion or exclusion into governing spaces, notwithstanding their liberation struggle credentials. This results in the reproduction of pervasive

gendered violence within a political culture that tokenises the expression of women as political agents within the securitised space as a form of survival (Ball et al., 2003; Bryden & Olonisakin, 2010; Kunz, 2014; Mama & Okazawa-Rey, 2012:100).

In 2014, former Vice President Joice Mujuru was accused of plotting to assassinate President Mugabe. Mujuru was met with gendered slurs, which accused her of using “sex to ensure political loyalty” amongst others, by members of an opposing ZANU-PF faction (Tendi, 2016:217). The gendered nature of surveillance highlights the adoption of hypermasculine power politics in Zimbabwe even by women through the “nature of surveillance material that is gathered and what is emphasized about this information” (Tendi, 2016:217). Grace Mugabe, who saw this as an opportunity to advance her political mileage, publically shamed Mujuru. She claimed to have “set up” and acquired a video of Mujuru “in a mini-skirt, speaking ill of [her] and [then] president” Robert Mugabe (Tendi, 2016:217). As Tendi (2016:217) notes, Grace Mugabe’s attempts at ascending to power “sought to exert moral authority over Mujuru” and were reflective of the patriarchal tensions within ZANU-PF. According to Moore (2018c: 8–9), Grace Mugabe’s later presence in the ZANU-PF succession race that fed into the coup of 2017, through the Generation 40 (G-40) ZANU-PF faction,⁷ highlighted the “‘castration anxiety’ of the men around her” who dominated factional politics. Moore further notes that her previous persecution of Mujuru “rests its case on the certainty that ‘there must always be a harlot who can be brought to heel’” (Mudiwa, 2017, in Moore, 2018c: 8). Gendered surveillance, as a tenet of control, is reflective of normalised hypermasculinity within the militarism discourse, which uses normalised notions of idealistic womanhood lodged in deference, rather than merit, as a barometer for competence when women no longer serve the broader political agenda of hegemonic elites (Kunz, 2014:604). This aspect of the politics of continuity is vital to understanding the gendered aspect of surveillance and the networks that inform it.

The politics of continuity is also enabled by the network of state surveillance for the purposes of elite accumulation (Kriger, 2012; Moore, 2012). Economic strains in the late 1990s, caused by allegiances in the war in the Congo, pay-outs to war veterans in 1997, as well as the country’s Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), led to the decline in civil servant service conditions which propelled strikes and gave rise to the labour movement (Alexander, 2013:811;

Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:55). In 1993, then Commander of the ZDF, Vitalis Zvinavashe, defined the role of the army during this period thus: “[as] an army our role during ESAP is to provide protection, undisturbed security and guard against any threats” (quoted in Tendi, 2013:837).

This was despite legal injunctions inhibiting military personnel from interfering in the goings-on of the bureaucratic state (Moyo, 2015:164). Militarised interferences in civic and socio-economic issues became a regular occurrence, with human rights violations also rising, in response to protests over corruption and over sustainable economic opportunities by both civilians and war veterans (Eppel, 2009a, 2009b, 2013). The West’s preoccupation with eliminating communism in the region – given the ideology’s presence in South Africa at the time – Zimbabwe’s ruling elite was not sanctioned for human rights abuses committed under the guise of domestic capitalist state protectionism (Doran, 2017; Moore, 2018c:3). Kriger (2012:12–13) and Raftopoulos (2009) cite, in this regard, the increased surveillance and prominence of informalised alliance politics during crises periods from 1998 onwards, given the rise of opposition politics. Tendi (2013:841) highlights the period from 2000 onwards as one under a mandate to protect ZANU-PF from the opposition as the perceived “threat”. During this period, “a system of mass politici[s]ation began in the rural areas” (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005:360). Other than villagers being forced to attend rallies, many chiefs were corrupted and *pungwes* – “political indoctrination sessions ... used by guerrillas in the *Second Chimurenga* as a politicisation technique” – were reintroduced (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005:360). Sachikonye (2011:9) refers to *pungwes* as an institutional legacy of guerrilla violence and coercion, as the compulsory meetings mobilised support for the indoctrination of partisan political agendas. It is then predictable that militarisation in the post-independence state continues to retain this characteristic, with former guerrillas now having become *securocrats*.

Citing reasons further reasons for the increased presence of the military into becoming “a parallel state”, Chitiyo (2009:27) cites the rejection of 2000 the constitutional amendment as a defining moment in Zimbabwe’s history. In 2000, civil servants were deemed “politically disloyal, a far less tolerable source of difference for the ruling party than technocratic ideals” (Alexander, 2013:811). The need to protect elite interests resulted in the politicisation of the public service and the de-professionalisation of their institutions coupled with a surge in security sector involvement from that year (Chitiyo, 2009:11). From 2000 onwards, it was common knowledge that non-

partisan and opposition aligning citizens in public service were “being watched [and were at risk] of being seen as a traitor[s]” (McGregor, 2013:789). The notion of an ongoing struggle was founded in the government’s rejection of market-led economic transformation in favour of state-led economic transformation named the *Third Chimurenga* or “Third Liberation War” against political and economic “threats” to disguise rampant neopatrimonialism within the state (Tendi, 2013).

The semantics of war and nationalist (yet partisan) protectionism of the state only sought to benefit patrons and clients associated with the ruling elite (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). The infiltration of such groups into the public service was a “lethal mix” as they acted as proxies for the state by way to additional recruitment of personnel into the security services (Scarnecchia, 2006, in Bratton, 2016:82). This raised concerns over the distinction between regular and paramilitary functions and resulted in continued clemencies for human rights violations (Bratton, 2016:82). Other than the infiltration of youth militia into civil service as clients and surveyors, “soldiers instituted a partisan and disciplinary surveillance over the professionals, justified by their own narrative of an ongoing liberation struggle” (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:753; Kriger, 2012:15). The legacies of such interventions can still be seen in 2019 and remain in direct contradiction to legal provisions prohibiting military personnel from politics. This is buttressed by Section 200 (2) and (3) of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, which prohibits members of the civil service from engaging in politics from any partisan standpoint other than exercising their constitutional right to vote (Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013; Moyo, 2015:164). Essentially, the positions given to these youth and other groups, such as war veterans, enabled extractive institutions, citizen intimidation, and anarchy through a network of surveillance to the benefit of ZANU-PF, whilst being against the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

2.2 Accumulation and Business

Securocrats have been pivotal to the politics of accumulation and neopatrimonialism in Zimbabwe. Tendi (2013:835) asserts that “Mugabe [retained] overall control of military elites, despite inconstant allegiance of some”. This was done through adherence to ZANU-PF hierarchical structures as explained in Chapter III (3). Despite the late General Solomon Mujuru’s advice to have a succession plan within ZANU-PF structures, President Mugabe isolated power in the

executive. Mugabe was insistent on the gradual decline of “military leaders’ power in relation to [him]” (Tendi, 2013:838). Factional politics between the Mujuru camp and the Mnangagwa camp, as well as Mugabe’s fears of Mnangagwa’s presidential aspirations, often spurred tokenised investigations into corruption charges under the Mugabe regime (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:58). Under the Mnangagwa regime, this has not changed. For those who remain within party structures and benefit from the tenets of clientelism, there is an awareness to maintaining a clear stance on partisan politics in favour of the ruling elite remains in their best interests.

The centralised control of rent-seeking can be further seen in the networks employed to support patrons in Zimbabwe (Khan, 2010:10; Kriger, 2012:12-6). As Alexander (2013:810) notes, ZANU-PF had inherited “a powerful, centralised, bureaucratic state and it greatly expanded its size and role in the 1980s, largely as a result of the extension of services to the [B]lack majority”. Consequently, a crucial legacy network remaining from the Rhodesian era is the elitist access to the business community (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:3). A 2008 discussion paper by the Zimbabwe Institute (2008:16) illustrates this security-military-business network through the business interests of President Mnangagwa, who “spearheaded party operations” as the former Party Secretary for Finance, and the late General Solomon Mujuru, who used his access to mineral resources to expand his business empire. Their networks are noted as (still) including “business magnates like Billy Rautenbach and John Bredenkamp, former Finance Director of the Rhodesian Defence Force and...BAE Systems (British Aerospace) agent for Southern Africa” at the time (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:16).

In 2019, President Mnangagwa’s empire continues to expand with business allies such as Kudakwashe Tagwirei of Sakunda Holdings, which holds the monopoly on key economic pipelines, such as fuel in Zimbabwe through “Trafigura Zimbabwe, a joint venture with Trafigura, one of the world’s largest oil traders” (Cotterill, 2019). However, in between December 2019 and February 2020, Swiss-based Trafigura Pte bought out Sakunda’s 51% stake to 100% own Trafigura Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2020). As Cotterill (2019) reports, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had warned the Zimbabwean government to stop printing money to facilitate pay-outs to Sakunda. Pay-outs such as the “\$366m in government bonds [the company received] as payments for supplying “Command Agriculture”⁸ continue to plunge the struggling economy deeper into

economic crisis” (Cotterill, 2019). Similarly, Vice President Constantine Chiwenga – a retired general – and his ex-wife, Jocelyn Chiwenga, also have major stakes in “agriculture [as well as] wildlife management and manufacturing” (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:16). Elite networks remain mutually beneficial in the mandate for self-preserved accumulation. This remains juxtaposed against a socio-economic situation which continues to deteriorate for many citizens as highlighted in Chapter III (2.4).

Commenting on the incestuous nature of elite networks, Raftopolous (1996 in Magure, 2012:69) alludes to the idea that ZANU-PF subverted an autonomous domestic bourgeoisie as their independence within a free market system “would not need to rely on ruling party patronage and thus would be less easy to control.” An increase in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is also reflective of the ruling elite’s wish to gain firm control of the economy (Magure, 2012:69). As Dawson and Kelsall (2013:58) note, “ZANU-PF’s business empire is both opaque and keenly contested by factions within the party” who seek to benefit from rents themselves. The protection of rents for personal gain is highlighted by Tendi (2013):

Mugabe’s post-2000 prebendalism was designed to shore up ZANU(PF), amid the emergence of a credible opposition MDC party. Mugabe increasingly opened the state’s door to military elites, giving them their “turn to eat” and showing resolute determination to defend their new entitlements from an opposition party takeover. (p. 841)

From independence onwards, negotiations for a shared vision for governance and development were carried out by technocratic bureaucrats and politicians alike. Patron-client relations that breed patronage economies, however, remain damaging to the economy, as self-preserving policies set by the elite continue to dictate governance strategies (Handley, 2008:5, in Magure, 2012:68; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:14). Magure (2012:68) notes that this merging of the political and commercial elite is “compounded by a weak civil society and a weak opposition”, unable to call out rife clientelism.

The monopolisation of self-preserving policies and its links to securocrats could be seen in 2005 in the National State Security Council. Dominated by members of the security community, the Council was chaired by President Mugabe and included both Vice Presidents Joseph Msika and

Joice Mujuru. Other members included Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono, Defence Minister Sydney Sekeramayi, Home Affairs Minister Kembo Mohadi, and State Security Minister Didymus Mutasa. With nine departments tasked to manage “all economic sectors and it oversees foreign exchange and monetary policy”, the council became the *de facto* cabinet alongside the influential JOC (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:14). Furthermore, as Dawson and Kelsall (2013) emphasise:

ZANU-PF’s readiness to extract rents from business through regulatory predation increased insecurity for capital, raising costs, and it became increasingly profitable not to produce but to trade, seeking arbitrage on everything from foreign currency to fuel. In such an environment, a productive capitalist sector could not develop. (p. 53)

Militarised interference can also be seen after the JOC’s Operation Reduce Prices – a clampdown to try and ease astronomical inflation rates – in 2007. Businesses were forced to slash prices by more than 50% by appointed inspectors – most of whom were from the security community. Those who failed to comply were jailed (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008: 15). As Magure (2012) laments:

ZANU PF’s militarised patronage system under the guise of indigenisation provides a perfect opportunity to well-connected members of the Zimbabwean ruling party-state complex to become rich overnight. Indications so far are that the implementation of the empowerment policy is vindictive and lacks transparency. (p. 80)

Dawson and Kelsall (2013:55) argue that the relationship between, “white financial power ... and [B]lack political power” began to “crumble” in the late 1990s as the ZANU-PF agenda of self-preservation became clearer. It can, however, be argued that white monopoly capital simply diversified its assets and investments; and sought to gain access to the market through methods different from those it had been accustomed to using before independence and farm invasions. One such method has involved white monopoly capitalists aligning themselves with ruling Black majority securocrats to ensure their interests are preserved. This is exemplified in the aforementioned relationships with Billy Rautenbach and John Bredenkamp, as well as in the support given to the Mnangagwa regime by white Zimbabweans who attended a ZANU-PF rally in July 2018 staged specifically for them ahead of the presidential election (Al Jazeera, 2018; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:16). This further adds to the notion that Mnangagwa had appeased

certain white farmers in the Midlands, such as the Coetzee family, founders of Dendairy (a major player in the dairy industry) who have been farming in Kwekwe – Mnangagwa’s hometown and political stronghold until the July 2018 elections – for over 50 years (Bratton, 2016:202; Laing & Thornycroft, 2016). Protection and accumulation in business can, thus, not be seen along racial lines. The allocation of resources remains influenced by the political progression of the ruling elite for the protection of investments. This is the case even as ZANU-PF remains unforgiving of those who distance themselves after having benefitted from partisan patronage (Magure, 2012:68–69).

2.3 Accumulation and Diamonds

In 1997, the ZDF, together with the armed forces of Angola, Namibia, and the DRC, was deployed in the DRC to support Congolese President Laurent Kabila against an insurgency (supported by Rwanda and Uganda) in the First Congo War, coined “Africa’s First World War”. The ZDF was deployed to Kinshasa and Mbuji Mayi to protect the Congolese government and the country’s major diamond region respectively (Chitiyo, 2009:7). This changed the dynamics within the Zimbabwean military. Personal accumulation of wealth by senior military personnel was stark and “bled national resources”, with the campaign in the DRC costing Zimbabwe US\$1 million a day in 1998–1999 (Sachikonye, 2011:23). This included Emmerson Mnangagwa, the late General Solomon Mujuru, and other senior members of the JOC (Kriger, 2012:22). In 1998, a joint venture between the ZDF and the Congolese was formed through the trading company Congo-Duka. Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (OSLEG) replaced Congo-Duka and gave way for another joint venture company, Cosleg, with Kabila’s Comiex-Congo (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:58). In 2002, the 10,000 troops that had been placed in charge of Kabila’s protection were withdrawn from the DRC; however, as Dawson and Kelsall (2013:58) note, “military and commercial activity continued”. As Chitiyo (2009) further writes:

various trade and service agreements between the Zimbabwean and Congolese government formalised the ZDF’s role as military entrepreneurs who profited from access to diamonds, cobalt and other Congolese resources. Zimbabwe’s military, business and political elite became part of a global network of diamond dealers who profited from the Congo war. Although Zimbabwe’s military presence in the DRC was downscaled in 2002, the Harare-Kinshasa diamond “axis” has remained, with Harare itself

becoming a major entrepôt in the illicit diamond trade. The Congo trade and Zimbabwe's internal diamond "industry" have cemented the Zimbabwe military's role as the dominant class in Zimbabwe's business community. (p. 7)

Commercial and mining revenues are an example of elite accumulation within the formal state thus solidifying extractive institutions, patron-client relations and anti-development strategies through policies that only benefitted the elite (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013; Moore, 2012). Noted by Dawson and Kelsall (2013:58), "Mugabe has been careful to preserve control over the party while meeting the rent expectations of his generals elsewhere (for example, the DRC, SOEs, farms and the Chiadzwa diamonds)". In 2004, the late General Mujuru became director of River Ranch mine located in the South-West of Zimbabwe which he owned with ZANU-PF Central Committee Member Trivanhu Mudariki, and an investor Saudi Arabia. This asset is said to be at the core of his succession struggles within his party (Partnership Africa Canada, 2010:8 in Kriger, 2012:22). Sachikonye (2011: 23) infers that the DRC entrenched the conscious realisation of the military as part of both the bureaucratic state and of the political hierarchy, where it remained an "interested party" in ZANU-PF accumulation strategies – within the governance structures of the state.

Whilst accumulation occurred, surveillance was omnipresent. As Kriger (2012:21) notes, "[the] police, prisons service, army, and CIO have got groups of people who are working for those lieutenants, known as 'syndicates'". The benefits of illicit mining activities, thus, flow to securocrats in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye, 2011:23).

As Alexander (2013:812) highlights, securocrat involvement in diamond mining – especially, from 2006 onwards, in Marange district – "'cemented' their 'role as the dominant class in Zimbabwe's business community'". The JOC oversaw the Chiadzwa mines in Marange district, where diamonds were mined even after the disbanding of the JOC in the aftermath of the 2008 GPA (Partnership Africa Canada, 2010, and Raftopoulos, 2010:221–222, in Kriger, 2012:21). Since the GNU, only five companies have been granted licenses to mine in Marange: "two Chinese companies, two South African private companies[,] Mbada and Canadile[,] and Pure Diamonds" (Kadzere, 2010, and Veritas, 2011, in Kriger, 2012:21). The state-owned Zimbabwe Mining and Development Corporation (ZMDC) created a subsidiary, Marange Resources, in July 2009, to manage its joint ventures, becoming a 50% owner of Mbada and Canadile. The Chinese companies

were under the patronage of then Chief of the ZDF, General Constantine Chiwenga, and Chief of the CIO, Happy Bonyongwe (HRW, 2010:6, Global Witness 2010: 15, Partnership Africa Canada, 2010:5, and Swain, 2011, in Kriger, 2012:22). However, the benefits of “mining concessions only continue as long as the personal relationships that made them possible remain productive” (Kriger, 2012:22). Violence is often unleashed to subvert those who are no longer viewed as enablers of the system of accumulation.

In November 2010, six executive directors of the two diamond mining corporations – Mbada and Canadile – were “arrested for suspected fraud over a licence to mine” in Marange (BBC, 2010). According to one of the arrested, Lovemore Kurotwi – “[t]he largest shareholder of the private company that joined ZMDC to form Canadile... a senior figure in the Fifth Brigade” (Kriger 2012:22) and nephew of former Commander of the ZDF, Vitalis Zvinavashe – this arrest was a backlash from Minister of Mines and Mining Development, Obert Mpofu. Mpofu had allegedly requested a US\$ 10 million bribe which Kurotwi refused to pay. According to a letter written by Kurotwi to parliament, the “personal, selfish interests’ highlights [*sic*] the personalised nature of this conflict and the way in which the [elite] actors [used] the court and the parliament to resolve it” (Kriger, 2012:22).

The result was ZMDC taking 100% ownership of Canadile and the acquittal of five of the six board members arrested. However, the Kurotwi case continued (Kriger, 2012:22). The effect of securocrat involvement upon civilians in Marange can be seen in the “paramilitary attacks against illegal gold and diamond panners” (Chitiyo, 2009:6). Operations Chikoroza Chapera and Hakudzokwi (trans. Operations No More Mining and No Return) were characteristic of these attacks, with over 300 civilian fatalities reported, and further showed the abuse of power, and the violent tactics for self-preservation used, by securocrats. The militarisation process involving operations to preserve elite interests will be discussed later in this chapter (Chitiyo, 2009:6).

Even within elite spaces, mutual commercial and rent accumulation is dependent on the absence of competition, thus reflecting the militarised nature of Zimbabwe’s political economy (Alexander, 2013:812; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008:47; Chitiyo, 2009:4–11; Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:57–59). In August 2011, General Solomon Mujuru was burnt to death inside his farmhouse. His

“suspicious death”, as well as that of his key diamond buyer in a car accident a few days prior to his, has continued to question the violence of the politics of accumulation in Zimbabwe. These fatalities have often been linked to the wishes of the JOC and Mnangagwa to have “exclusive access to mining Marange diamonds”, which had always been inhibited by Mujuru as a shareholder in ZMDC-linked African Consolidated Resources Ltd. (Partnership Africa Canada, 2010: 4, in Kriger, 2012:22–23).

2.4 Accumulation and Land

Another key aspect of securocrat accumulation in Zimbabwe has been the control and ownership of land. This follows on as a legacy of the 1969 Land Tenure Act which “consolidated primitive accumulation” by 6000 white Rhodesian farmers (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:51). Section 16 of the provisional Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, considered the land question one of the most contested rents in Zimbabwe’s political economy discourse. Section 16 sought to guarantee property rights of white Rhodesian farmers for ten years starting in 1980. In 1990, the 1992 Land Acquisition Act which facilitated the “willing buyer-willing seller” principle was adopted (AAPPG, 2009:32). In the early 1990s, ownership of all commercial farm lands in Zimbabwe by ZANU-PF members in government positions was projected at 8% (van de Welle, 2001:122). This was not reflective of an overall change of ownership within wider society. Following ZANU-PF’s loss of the February 2000 referendum that had proposed changes towards government acquisition of land without compensation to Zimbabwe’s Constitution as well as political gains within the MDC; 4000 farmers were violently removed from their farms by ZANU-PF aligned youth militia and war veterans. Resultantly, prior to the general election in June 2000, the number of government acquired farms doubled to 2,942 from an initial 1,471 (AAPPG, 2009:35-7). This showed that efforts to safeguard the “national” to be within the confines of securing ZANU-PF hegemonic power and accumulation.

Even in the political settlement of 2008, the land question remained pivotal and unaddressed under Article V of the GPA (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:3-5; Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:11-5). Legally, elements of accountability which bind government were not plausible as government were not

bound to the GPA. Again, the common conflation of the state with the ZANU-PF party was “unwittingly” constructed thus creating technical inaccuracies for implementation of any reforms (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:14). Moreover, recommendations for a land survey and land audit, as part of efforts at redistribution and accountability, further misunderstood the lack of political will in the historical ruling elite to undertake such a project and to relinquish power. ZANU-PF refused to engage with the question of redistribution whilst targeted Western sanctions against party elites remained (ICG, 2010:1; Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:15). Tendi (2013:841) highlights that from 1980 to 2000, ZANU-PF pushed the narrative of nationalist politics, buttressed by justifications for the contested *Third Chimurenga*. In the post-2000 period, the ruling party shifted to protect itself from rising political opposition through a process of militarised re-centralisation, backed by patronage and the politics of accumulation (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:58; Tendi, 2013:837–841; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:2). As Alexander and McGregor (2013) note:

[c]ontrol over land and mineral resources has been the source of immense political capital for ZANU(PF), as partisan access has been used to win votes in the countryside and towns and to undercut the [opposition], which has had little or nothing in terms of material reward to offer its supporters. (p. 758)


This mismanagement has resulted in “land tenure insecurity” thus impeding prospects for agricultural outputs and subsequent food security (Welborn et al., 2019:29). With land, as “a primary method by which ZANU PF dispenses patronage, secures support, and commands loyalty” (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:15), hopes that the GPA would address this endemic clientelist problem were ambitious. This is illustrated by the November 2008 ruling by the SADC tribunal to grant compensation to white farm owners that was thwarted by the Zimbabwe High Court (Bratton, 2016:225). Furthermore, a legacy of ZANU-PF neopatrimonialism is seen in how Minister of Finance under the Mnangagwa regime, Mthuli Ncube, who was appointed on supposed technocratic merits, received a nearly 8,400-hectare farm near Hwange from the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture in 2002 (Moore, 2012: 7). Yet, in 2019, as Minister of Finance, he is an integral part of the exclusive patron-client network that oversees Zimbabwe’s anti-development trajectory (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013: 49).

Rents have been a key aspect of ZANU-PF control since independence, and military accumulation has simultaneously been on the rise (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015). Violence has typically been a means to achieving this end, as seen in the methods used to undertake the Zimbabwe's land reform programme since 2000 (Sachikonye, 2011:37). Violent interventions towards accumulation are historically entrenched in societies and can be linked to literature around conquest, power, and self-interest (Moore, 2012:5). Outside neo-classical economic analyses, rent-seeking evolves policies and institutions when accrued outside government created monopolies that grant surety to elites. If citizen agency is to contribute to robust institutions, rent-seeking must be made inclusive and presented as a consultative process guided by formal rules and institutions. In countries like Zimbabwe, however, rent-seeking remains centralised, which renders it unregulated (Khan, 2018:690). Civil-military relations are, thus, increasingly asymmetric where citizen agency is subverted.

CHAPTER V

Problems with Transforming Institutions

Figure 1 Note Apt illustration of the cyclical nature of injustice in Zimbabwe



Source: Musarurwa et al., 2016:141

The securocrat problem is still a key concern for Zimbabwe in 2019. That said, the question for TJ interventions remains a reiteration of the one initially posed by Diamond (1988:24): “how [can TJ] transform the complex nature of civil-military relations so that the military evolves into a “professional body” that stands outside politics and civil society”? As the visibility and influence of the Zimbabwean military continues to grow in the political economic space under the Mnangagwa regime, the complex realities of addressing Zimbabwe’s challenges, given the endemic politics of continuity by elites, deepen (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010, in Kriger, 2012:12; Hoffman, 2012:138-44; Moyo, 2015:160). As Bratton and Masunungure (2018:16) note: “[i]n the end, the greatest resource available for healing the beloved country is the citizenry itself”. Progression through state institutions is then based on informal relationships rather than formal institutional rules. These realities are steeped in power relations and the active efforts made at re-

aligning them for personalised survival (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758). Rent-seeking ideally evolves policies and institutions for the better however it is difficult when the process remains extractive in this manner (Khan, 2017). Institutional reform is then needed to rupture the current *modus operandi* which relies on suppressing political neutrality whilst offering patronage for loyalties (Hirschman, 1970; Mkandawire, 2015:571-2). Likewise, where social protections for citizens are concerned, patronage power politics inhibit economic growth, poverty reduction and redistributive wealth as the economics of clientelism are not sustainable (Magure, 2012:80).

Tackling patronage economies has direct linkages to challenging the institutions and elites that enable their existence. TJ efforts – in particular SSR programmes – are vital as a main facilitator for political settlements in post-conflict and post-authoritarian institutions, though political will is needed (Bratton, 2016:189–229). To achieve development and socio-economic progression through existing institutions, Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) argue for inclusive, rather than exclusive (inherently extractive), institutions. Access to the political space in this instance is equal; where political competition and transferral of political power is both accessible and fluid regardless of one's partisan political views. Deciphering at which level institutions should be inclusive and the type of inclusion that is to be presented for effectiveness, also remains a strategic challenge for potential transitional processes. This is even more so when political settlements analysis still does not address profound questions, such as those of enforceability and commitments to the credibility of agreements and institutions within a state (Khan, 2018:671). Khan (2010) posits a more critical approach if one's desired outcome is a developmental state which favours sustainable economic growth. For Khan (2010:13), the “organisation of power” within institutions, rather than institutions themselves, is crucial to determining the costs and benefits of re-engineering existing, or creating new, institutions. He argues that too much power given to varied bargaining groups within a political space is unlikely to build developmental institutions as government may disinvest if it believes it will lose upcoming elections (Khan, 2010; Hickey, 2015).

In this case, rebuilding Zimbabwe is to be approached from a Khanian (2010) perspective that is centred on debunking power dynamics. Likewise, Hendricks (2005: 121) stresses that “[r]e-building Zimbabwe requires far more than elite pacting. It involves building the institutions and the capacity that sustain democratisation and avoiding the slippery slope between democracy and autocracy”.

Though this is true, elite pacts also facilitate the functioning of institutions and the progression or lack thereof of democratic progression in the state. This inherent challenge of the distribution of power is dictated by the structure of the contextual political settlement and the actors that operate within it (Khan, 2018:672). Sachikonye (2011:82) buttresses this by highlighting how ZANU-PF controls most resources during various election campaigns, though “this has not necessarily translated to votes”. Here, the ruling elite disinvest in strengthening formal institutions towards developmental institutions and coerce legitimacy through manipulation and control of electoral outcomes and state sponsored violence upon those who disagree with their preferred outcome (Eppel, 2013:211; Moore, 2012:1-2).

Weak institutions with limited capacities remain ineffective. Collapsing institutions breed unsustainable economic prospects in patronage economies which challenge wealth creation for the average citizen. This is specifically problematic where regeneration of rents and resources is stagnant whilst illicit exchanges continue (Khan, 2017; Magure, 2012:80). Navigating Zimbabwe out of a state of neopatrimonial militarism must, therefore, be a process that targets key aspects of militarisation and its effect on institutions (Alexander, 2013; Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014). This process can only be effected when political circumstances allow (Bratton, 2016: 205–208).

Navigating Militarism, TJ and SSR

Though institutional capacity must be enhanced while deconstructing the militarisation of Zimbabwean society, human security aspects must not be omitted during the transformative process (Hutchful, 2009:10; Lambourne, 2009). The need for SSR is then essential. SSR mandates itself with navigating shifting militarised power politics and political settlements in post-conflict and post-authoritarian settings (Hutton, 2010:203). As Bryden and Olonisakin (2010) note:

[a] holistic definition of SSR stresses the need for an effective, well-managed and accountable security sector that requires the application of sound public sector management principles. SSR is [thus] identified as a human security issue that must combine development, human rights and security concerns. Significantly, security and justice reforms are regarded as parallel, mutually reinforcing processes. (p. 8)

Within peace and security literature, SSR is located at the intersection of “traditional security sector-related interventions with broader good governance and democratization imperatives” (Hutton, 2010:192). SSR is then to be understood as a tenet of TJ (Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 2009:2). The lack of SSR in Zimbabwe stems from “the colonially inherited paradigm of uneven development” as Hendricks and Hutton (2009:1) note. Institutions have remained extractive whilst the economics of neopatrimonialism have remained dominant in the Smith and Mugabe regimes as well as now during the Mnangagwa regime. All this whilst blanket clemencies have continued and regime transitions repeat missed opportunities to deliberately recreate replicas of the systems that benefit elite accumulation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013:410; Eppel, 2004:50; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:2). This has buttressed a culture which supports the interests of elites with bargaining power within society and does not favour bottom-up justice efforts to allow a pervasive “securocrat problem” (Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:11-12; ICG, 2010:11-3). This is particularly true within the security community which has been favoured with impunity (Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:143; Eppel, 2013:213-4). Attention to civil-military education and the re-engagement with a history other than the one manufactured by the state since 2000 to demonise ZAPU, MDC, the Rhodesians, the West, and the United Kingdom (UK), are necessary (Chitiyo, 2009:40). The work of memory studies and of telling accurate histories in thwarting denialisms of perpetration and forcing accountability is also vital to the process of reform (Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:143; Eppel, 2013:213-4). Yet, undertaking SSR that leverages transitional justice’s “heavy reliance on the universality of human rights norms” (Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:144) and rethinking the securitised landscape of Zimbabwean politics, remain challenging in a context where institutions and socio-economic protections are designed to protect securocrats (Anderson, 2011 in Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, 2018:60; Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010, in Kriger, 2012:12; Teitel, 2000:4).

As noted in the previous chapter analysing TJ, liberal processes that shift political cultures based on political will and a lack of acknowledgement or retribution recreate cycles of injustice (Eppel, 2013:211-50; Dancy et al., 2013:8). Seen in the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement, the 2008 GPA as well as the sanitisation of the 2017 coup d’état; post-settlement efforts at reform coupled with inconsistent application of SSR provisions by both the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) are problematic for concretised understandings of the application and implementation of SSR

where Zimbabwe is concerned (Hutchful, 2009:10; Louw-Vaudran, 2017, in Bailie, 2018). Though Zimbabwe's stability and reconstruction remains beneficial to the region; sovereignty and elite interest has been a "stumbling block for outside intervention" where peace and security are concerned (Hendricks, 2005:119; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12; Mutisi, 2011). The inconsistencies at regional and continental levels often translate into lack of clarity which enables corrupt governments to interpret the security sector brief in a way that suits their best interests when accused of violating good governance principles (Ball et al., 2003; Hendricks, 2005:119-20). Here, much needed reforms such as the re-professionalisation of state institutions such as the ZEC are currently unattainable (Chitiyo, 2009:38). This remains as a challenge for revising asymmetric power hierarchies present within the domestic security community. Issues of legitimacy and power within long term security sector governance remain unaddressed and cyclical episodes of violence within militarized societies continue (Ball et al., 2003:294).

When engaging in state reforms, the immediate aspiration is often towards one of purist democratic attributes. One must however grasp that the political culture has not caught up to match the political will needed for institutional changes (Bratton, 2016:208). The hard work of changing systemically entrenched institutions – especially those that support branches of the security sector and political economy – is that their legitimacy and integrity must be rebuilt to affect plausible SSR for both security personnel as well as citizens (Chitiyo, 2009:34; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12). Failure to do this, as per the prediction by the ICG report, *Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition* (2010) could:

prevent a smooth transition to the post-Mugabe era and raise real prospects of a coup, with accompanying instability that would affect the whole region. A dozen or so "securocrats" – senior military and intelligence figures – are widely considered to hold de facto veto power over any real transition. (p.4)

The above forecasts extracted from the 2010 report have come to pass and still haunt the country in 2019. The lack of SSR in Zimbabwe has resulted in entrenched influence of securocrats as "the bedrock for ZANU-PF in political governance" which services patron-client accumulation (Mutisi, 2011:4). Acts of state-sanctioned subversion continue to be met by those seeking to transform Zimbabwean institutions in 2019 (Amnesty International, 2019). As Kriger (2012:12-13) notes, violence and patronage are "often interdependent processes" to build power. Moore (2012:2)

identifies violence as revealed in two forms when there is accumulation at stake. Firstly, to those without access to alternative accumulative possibilities are easily recruited into brutal enterprises. Secondly, when opposition to the project of accumulation is felt (Moore, 2012:2). Formal rules for governance and inclusive development dictated by what is deemed to be ‘rational’ for attaining legitimacy are deemed less important than economic incentives for elite accumulation (Weber, 1978:1006-1110, in Khan, 2005:10).

As a leader, based on Kahneman (1994)’s reading, rationality is assumed as optimal decisions for the benefits of preserving one’s legitimacy. Even in 2019, when protests erupted due to a lack of social protections and economic opportunities, there was a direct response from the military and other state security forces for elites to retain positions of power (Ndlovu, 2018; Amnesty International, 2019; Raftopolous, 2019). Their deployment prompted “government to funnel additional funds towards the military, reducing funding available for other [civic] priorities” (Welborn et al., 2019:25). As Khan (2005:12) highlights, “patron-client factions...compete for the capture of public resources in ways that are relatively unconstrained by economic viability considerations”. Attempted constraints would be challenged. SSR remains useful in the redistribution of military budgets to poverty reduction initiatives (Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 2009:1). Calls for measures to reduce military budgets are however unlikely as things stand in 2019 (Bratton, 2016:205-7; Chitiyo, 2009:43; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12-13).

This expression of a self-preserving form of survival by the ruling elite forms the antithesis of bureaucratic rationality in the neopatrimonial state (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758; Khan, 2005:11). Reversing militarisation must include those who uphold the system (Chitiyo, 2009; Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, 2018:62). These are determined by political will and monitored by state institutions alongside a technocratic, non-partisan civil society (Bratton, 2016:205-8; Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, 2018). The goal is to enhance “effective and accountable security for the [s]tate and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law” (Ki-Moon, 2008:6). Given SSR’s tall order during the transitioning process, there must be a shared normative commitment to constitutional rules which are binding to all citizens if the human security project is to be accomplished in Zimbabwe through truth and accountability (de Greiff & Duthie, 2009:25).

A matrixed approach to SSR is needed given the militarised state of political affairs in Zimbabwe. This is important to legitimate previously disregarded credible political actors who should be part of the political settlement such as citizens (Bratton, 2016:205-6; Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014). Where TJ interventions that seek to establish non-resurgence of violence are concerned, Teitel (2000:3) cautions, “a state’s transitional responses [are] explained largely in terms of the relevant political and institutional constraints”. The independence and depoliticisation of the judiciary which is necessary to rebuilding trust between the state and its citizens by affecting the rule of law (Chitiyo, 2009:38; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:9-10). This is to aid the “structurally poor” who remain impoverished due to failed socio-economic policies are expected to remain politically apathetic and economically impoverished given the effects of continued elite sanctioned patronage systems (de Waal, 2002a:78). Political resonance remains the largest constraint as institutional militarised institutions remain closed and inflexible to downscaling budgets (Dancy et al., 2013; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:13; Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 2009:1; Welborn et al., 2019:25). As such, “[j]ustice seeking in these periods is fully epiphenomenal and best explained in terms of the balance of power” (Teitel, 2000:3). To support this, Kriger (2006:206) stresses the need to rethink the role of TJ processes in reproducing new political orders that may through exclusion of laws that recognise contributions to equitable democracy within transitional periods and merely regurgitate or reinvent unjust political orders. This is challenged by the legacy of militarism.

De Waal (2002a:78) notes that in an ideologically right-wing militarist system, “individuals who are authoritarian, elitist, secretive and exult in violence will rise to the top”. The decentralisation of power from the executive which leverages itself off allegiances to militarised elites must then be addressed (Diamond, 1988:26-7). Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2003:31-3) previously discussed criticisms of the 1987 Unity Accord remain useful as a blueprint for conditions of post-conflict settlements which are likely to led to healthy civil-military relations, social cohesion, peace and security in Zimbabwe. Once this has occurred, the petition previously highlighted through Eppel’s (2013) literature to pay “attention to the needs and expectations of conflict participants” (Lambourne, 2009:9) is to be fulfilled if the process of reform is to be sustainable.

De Waal (2002a:78) further suggests inroads towards peace as possible through civilian mobilization within society as “power relations inherent in this manifestation of militarism are antithetical to any form of civil action of this kind”. This is buttressed by notions that redressing past violations is a developmental goal for post-conflict and post-authoritarian states as “systematic human rights violations undermine human capacities” (de Greiff & Duthie, 2009:12). Regaining active citizenry from a trust deficit requires adherences to “economic security and freedom to live in dignity in terms of good governance, democratisation and protection of human rights” (Lambourne, 2009:9; Eppel, 2013; Moyo, 2019b:9). TJ processes have the capacity to grant agency to previously disenfranchised and victimised citizens by repositioning them as active agents in the political project of the state with social capital (de Greiff & Duthie, 2009:1, 22-3). This is however “political process, not a technical one” (Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 2009:4).

Political direction supersedes military coherence (Nkomo, 1984:156). The understanding that SSR is a political project that requires buy-in from citizens and elites alike is pivotal to this. For citizens to re-engage with democratic institutions, re-establishing vertical civic trust in relation to government accountability is vital (Mihr, 2013:310). This opens up the civic space and grants ordinary people “control over politicians and political institutions” in order to redefine strong political settlements between ruling elites and citizens (Diamond & Morlino, 2005 : xiii, in Mihr, 2013:310). In the aftermath of violence and injustice, “the less a country in transition can count on support, initiatives, or pressure from the international community, the less likely its political elites are to start the process” (Mihr, 2013:304). Likewise, lack of pressure to engage in truth-seeking initiatives produces the same result.

Governments under local and international pressure to pursue TJ initiatives to consolidate their legitimacy often install commissions of inquiry to show attention to grievances presented. In theory, this reflects responsiveness and promotes civic trust and should lead to civic participation (Mihr, 2013:304-5). However as discussed, in Zimbabwe, the legacies of such efforts have reflected engagement in theory rather than a commitment to implementation in practice (Amnesty International, 2002:16; Sitze, 2013:11-4). Essentially, the potential transformative relationship between TJ, development and democracy relies heavily on the “responsiveness and accountability of political elites, transparency, adherence to international human rights norms, and participation

by citizens” (Mihr, 2013:311). Without this, even if SSR, transformative apologies and other TJ engagements occur, defaulting back to the status quo remains high (Mihr, 2013; Tarusarira, 2019:212-3). Unchallenged political cultures which have assisted in the accumulation of resources and power for securocrats propel the abuse of state institutions. To challenge the system to transform a society and political economy, citizens must aspire to higher political expectations (Diamond, 1999; Mihr, 2013:310). This however assumes the presence of agency in the absence of securocrat subversion. As such, in roads must be made to apply pressure towards the decentralisation and depersonalisation of formal state institutions such as the judiciary and the executive – spaces which remains violently bound to serving elite interests in Zimbabwe (Alexander, 2013:811; Mihr, 2013:310; Sachikonye, 2011; Tendi, 2013:837).

Whilst Zimbabwe seeks transition out of authoritarianism, there are impediments in the culture of militarisation that hamper the prospects for non-recurrence. The first impediment is that maintaining a culture of authoritarianism and elitism relies on secrecy and “tight control of information” (de Waal, 2002a:75). Such secretive information that reveals plans for extraction, perpetration and the actors involved must be made public and perpetrators must be held accountable (Eppel, 2013; Goredema, 2004:105; Lambourne, 2009; Mani, 2008; Scarnecchia, 2011). Parmentier (2003, in Lambourne, 2009:12) identifies four types of truth: “forensic or factual truth; personal or narrative truth; social or dialogue truth; and healing or restorative truth”. These are all vital to understanding different violations and subsequent TJ needs for various people within society given endemic “serial amnesties” in the state (Bratton, 2016:220). Contrary to Chitiyo’s (2009:40-1) suggestion to have a truth commission that does not practice retributive justice; accountability and punishment for perpetration are key to validating the process (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018b:14-5; de Greiff & Duthie, 2009:25; Lambourne, 2009:11).

In reconceptualising truth-telling, Tarusarira (2019:212-3) speaks to the need for transformative apologies which are both retrospective and futuristic. The author argues that focus on the moral and practical aspects of political apologies allows for the overlooking of the structural underpinnings of perpetration (Tarusarira, 2019:212). At present, the tragedy of TJ interventions is that they have often equated redress within the culture of impunity as “individuali[s]ed criminal prosecutions, rather than efforts to contest the abuse of power enabled by structural injustice”

(Nesiah, 2016:5). Structural redress through transformative truth-telling challenges a change of this with perpetrators is pivotal for the guarantees of non-recurrence in transitioning societies (Tarusarira, 2019:212-3). Nesiah (2016:27-8) underscores the merits of employing such structural engagements as useful in rethinking pre-designed blueprints of TJ interventions in making them more relevant to the complexities of political landscapes. Though type of truth-seeking process diminishes the risk of advancing single narratives of events that blanket lived experiences under accepted national narratives; it must be careful not to remove victim agency by allowing perpetrators to determine forgiveness from remorse (Goldblatt & Meintjes, 1998:28; Olckers, 1996:62-7; Tarusarira, 2019:218-9). From this approach, institutional reform is a simultaneous developmental project where not only is the cycle of violence ruptured, but truth is meaningful in chartering avenues for justice delivery and vetting of indicted officials (Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 2009:1). Political will is however needed to engage with such reforms.

The second impediment lies in the “cult of violence” where the virtues of violence are demonstrations of manhood, dependability and bravery (de Waal, 2002a:76). Gender neutral stances towards TJ when navigating militarism can therefore not exist (Jelin, 2003; Olckers, 1996:61-5; Kunz, 2014). Comprehensive approaches to peacebuilding are thus needed to facilitate “security, legal, political, economic, structural, cultural and psychosocial conditions” necessary to turn the cult of violence into one of peace (Lambourne, 2009:7). Gendered defence reform is important as an institutional reform tool within the military – particularly where recruitment, sexual violence and reproductive health training is involved (Hendricks & Hutton, 2008; Olonisakin et al., 2015). Likewise, given the gendered nature of this violence, particular masculinities are elevated. As such, even women who rise in such societies tend to “replicate ‘masculine’ values of militarism” to survive (de Waal, 2002a:77). Narratives of power within those who are considered the ruling elite must therefore be reconstructed (de Waal, 2002a:77; Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:141; Kunz, 2014:605-9).

As Clarke (2008) notes, past SSR and TJ efforts have largely maintained cultures of militarised masculinities. This needs to be reconsidered in the transitional phase as voice (as a form of systemic inclusion or exclusion) either thwarts or replicates denialisms where the latter further suppresses victim agency in the public sphere. Victim-centric justice initiatives are then inherently abandoned (Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:140-2; Hirschman, 1970). From a gendered lens, both men

and women need to speak of often silenced sexual violations to address root causes and heal society (Olckers, 1996:62-5). Failure to account for the security needs of silenced groups results in cyclical effects of perpetration after the transitional period. In South Africa for instance, this has resulted in “alarmingly high rates of sexual violence” (Hutchful, 2009:8). Silence which is an active form of practicing agency must conversely be respected (Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:147).

Youth militia are another key aspect to consider when undertaking SSR in Zimbabwe. The benefits and employment received from the idealism of delivering the service of state sponsored violence by easily indoctrinated to the youth remains problematic if not adequately addressed. In militarised societies, they are cherished for their “physical energy, readiness to take risks, idealism, and courage” (de Waal, 2002a:77). The appeal for the youth to join the armed forces is also found in the “licenced thuggery” afforded to them when they are deployed to subvert perceived threats by opposition parties and civilians to government (de Waal, 2002a:78). The militia of groups such as the *Chipangano* (Kriger, 2012; Moore, 2012) remain an endemic problem in society. Chitiyo (2009:43) calls for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of such militia groups during the SSR process. This, coupled with Hendricks and Hutton (2009:12)’s call for strong governance to manage the threat of destabilisation however need to follow on from a stable economy where prospects for employment exist after the fact for these youths. Currently, the neopatrimonial state and the culture of prebendalism does not allow for this. Once a post-authoritarian negotiated settlement is flawed, DDR and subsequent SSR strategies follow suit to reproduce the same result where elites retain power. This has a negative bearing on prospects for inclusive development and socio-economic justice which remain under the control of exclusionary institutions which remain influenced by the military (Clarke, 2008:57-63).

Proposed conditions for change

Tensions exist in the literature surrounding the semantics of restructuring the security community in Africa. Arguments for Security Sector Transformation (SST) rather than SSR have been posited by scholars of militarisation from various security communities as a term, “reform” is said to be associated with tokenism (Ball et al., 2003:266). The argument presented is that the lack of political will to foster civic participation, include representation of marginalised groups within political settlements as well as harbour illegitimate regimes evidenced on the continent is symptomatic of

the of the comfort associated with the word “reform” within policy spaces (Ball et al., 2003:266). In this, SST is considered a contemporary approach to African security “grounded in the political, security and socio-economic trajectories of different African policies [by integrating challenges] of translating the ideal of transformation into real behavioural change on the ground” (Bryden & Olonisakin, 2010:4). As such, SST is complementary to delivering sustainable SSR (Bryden & Olonisakin, 2010:14-15).

Transforming asymmetric power relations is imperative to the politics of inclusivity, alleviating constraints experienced by civic and TJ practitioners on the ground. Though criticisms have identified SSR as “a piecemeal and narrow approach to changing the security establishment” (Hutchful & Fayemi, 2003, in Bryden & Olonisakin, 2010:7); the semantics of “transformation” rather than “reform” of the security sector remain as such before the political circumstances open to allow change. For this reason, at this current juncture in Zimbabwe, this thesis has not dwelt on this part of the literature on SSR in Africa. Rather, it has treated the politics of changing the face of the security community as thus – albeit the semantics (Bryden & Olonisakin, 2010:3). As Abrahamsen (2018:24) notes, SSR’s main goal seeks “to transform militaries by subjecting them to democratic, civilian control and instilling respect for human rights among officers and soldiers alike”. Despite Bryden and Olonisakin (2010:6)’s criticism that “SSR is seen largely as an externally generated and driven concept [with]... near absence of local ownership of externally supported reform processes”; it is necessary to look toward the practicalities of contextually identifying possibilities for non-recurrence the Zimbabwean case.

Encouraging senior military servicemen to retire is not a practicable idea in Zimbabwe at the current juncture. Even with the offer of immunity that Hendricks and Hutton (2009:12) propose, power politics and denialism of retributive justice are such that they have allowed securocrats to wield almost absolute power in the state without fear of consequence (Bratton, 2016; Eppel, 2013). Given the political situation in Zimbabwe in 2019, this thesis offers several practical recommendations to facilitate SSR in the country.

Foremost among them is the need to address market forces that can influence Zimbabwe’s leadership to concede to providing social protections. Economic analysis is imperative for

understanding the prospects for this aspect of SSR (de Greiff & Duthie, 2009:32). Economic growth is imperative, not only for democratic consolidation, but for reducing the risk of eruptive grievances. Failure to generate growth can create instability within the security services, as a deteriorating economic situation, coupled with hyperinflation, can threaten regular income and buying power (Hendricks, 2005:121). Disgruntled military personnel in such circumstances can find attractive the risk of a coup, amongst other militia para-activity, that disrupts the given political order (Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12; Kelsall, 2018; Karombo, 2019).

Likewise, “[p]olitical settlements can break down [when] the institutions necessary for system reproduction collapse” (Khan, 2017: 21). Since the 2017 coup, there are indications of the fragility of the political settlements of ZANU-PF securocrats and their historical clients. As Beardsworth et al. (2019) observe:

the security services also appear to be deeply internally divided, with factional divides existing within and between units of the police, intelligence services and military, and thus do not operate with a common objective in mind. In turn, this makes their behaviour hard to predict. (p. 595)

Such behaviour was evident on 23 June 2018 at a ZANU-PF rally at White City Stadium in Bulawayo where a bomb was detonated in an apparent assassination attempt on President Mnangagwa from the growing “fractures” within the ruling elite (Beardsworth et al., 2019:588). Likewise, a repeat of the 2008 *bhora musango* strategy was used by dissident ruling party officials in 2018. Here, Webster Shamu, a former provincial minister cautioned people at a Mashonaland West rally “to vote for ZANU-PF at parliamentary level, but vote with their conscience in the presidential polls” (Beardsworth et al., 2019:588). Beardsworth, Cheeseman and Tinho (2019:588) analyse this moment as “a warning to the new president not to threaten the economic and political privileges of the military figures who put him in power”. As the economy continues to collapse, there are limited resources and rents which strain historical patron-client relations. Fragmented politics within ZANU-PF coupled with a paralysed economy signals the collapse of the previously established economy of patronage and subsequent patron-client relations where there remains a struggle to secure ever-scarce benefits. The fluidity of political settlements which “arise and adapt as a consequence of crisis” must serve as a deterrent to ruling elites to alleviate the current political and economic crisis (Bratton, 2016:26).

Following from this, as elite grievances increase, President Mnangagwa will need to consolidate power by reconfiguring loyalties within the ruling party, the state and the international community. At a domestic level, this may be done punishing key corrupt figures. Consolidation with civilians and civic organisations is unlikely without this. If he does not do so, given the size and reach of the ZANU-PF network, someone supported within the given elite structures will enact such reforms and dislodge the president given heightened factional and business strains (Alexander, 2013:811-2; Kriger, 2012:12; Tendi, 2013:837-41). In the age of “market friendly human rights”, external actors who have interests in the state can act as catalysts to remedying a worsening economic situation by pressurising preconditions for good leadership. This is especially true when international actors work in solidarity with local human rights groups (Baxi, 2005, in Nesiah, 2016:30-1; Mani, 2008:257-9). In Zimbabwe however, the practicalities of such remain difficult given interested states such as China which continue to lend money to Zimbabwe irrespective of governance and human rights abuses (Chitiyo, 2009:46; Mani, 2008:253-61).

In 2019, Zimbabwe was still ruled by securocrats whose legitimacy lay in seniority within ZANU-PF structures and through military command (Tendi, 2013:837). Luckham and Hutchful (2010) remind one not to be disillusioned by the liberal reform project when dealing with authoritarian regimes:

Democratic governance of security cannot be assured if there is little democracy in the first place. Behind democratic façades, considerable continuity in regimes and ruling elites has often been maintained. Most African military and security establishments still remain in one sense or another ‘political armies’. Not only ex-military men but also ex-armed insurgents have reinvented themselves as democratically elected rulers... [they] have maintained themselves in office by manipulating elections and suppressing dissent. (p.34-35)

Without this democratic façade, they have neither power nor authority which of course remains as an undesirable outcome for the ruling elite which would be challenged (Musarurwa et al., 2016:143). Vetting processes could also cause ““governance vacuums” doing harm to the capacity of institutions—capacity that less-developed countries may not be able to do without” (Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 2009:3). Equally, calls to rethink the political capital of liberation credentials as a trajectory to assuming political power are idealistic at best. In Zimbabwe, there would be a need to rethink the positions of most government officials. As such, the professionalisation of all

military personnel to ensure they do not play a role in governance is still a distant and idealistic goal for SSR (Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12). For now, should current political cultures persist, the practicalities of a peacefully transitioning society with economic aspirations towards a developmental state, remain uncertain (Bratton, 2016:205-9; Hutton, 2010:203; Lambourne, 2009:7; Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 2009:4).

Endnotes

¹ Section 251 stipulates the “establishment and composition” of the NPRC; Section 252 provides the “functions” of the NPRC; Section 253 mandates the “reports” (Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013).

² Participants had to choose between the questions: “Those who are responsible for past political crimes should be granted amnesty, which means they would never be prosecuted” and “Those who are responsible for past political crimes should be held accountable; they should face consequences for what they have done” (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018b:14).

³ *Chimurenga* is to be classified as a revolutionary struggle. The *First Chimurenga* also known as *Umvukela* or The Second Matabele War was from 1896-7. The *Second Chimurenga* also known as the Rhodesian Bush War was from 1966-1979. This constituted the liberation war that resulted in the independence of Zimbabwe from settler colonial Rhodesian rule. This war was “marked the escalation of ruthless military tactics” ranging from violence between ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrilla forces; intra-movement violence between ZANU and ZANLA; as well as between guerrillas and the Rhodesian security forces, amongst others (Bratton, 2016:50). The *Third Chimurenga* has been ongoing since 2000 is against political and economic ‘threats’ (classified as sanctions, civilian, anti-corruption and trade union protests amongst others) which the government claims are delegitimising it within the state (Tendi, 2013).

⁴ This group of ex-ZIPRA and black Rhodesian Front (RF) dissidents were against Mugabe’s rule in the Northern Transvaal. ‘Super ZAPU’ was orchestrated by Rhodesian Criminal Intelligence Organisation (CIO) officers who had launched Operation Mute in 1982 to cause further disruption in Matabeleland and aggravate existing tensions in the newly formed Zimbabwean government (Meredith, 2002:64).

⁵ Inflation rate stood at 231,000,000% at the time (Kadzere, 2008, in Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:80).

⁶ Rape was considered a form of genocide in *Prosecutor v. Akayesu* (1998) at the ICTR and a crime against humanity in *Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo* (2001) at the ICC. The latter ruling is an interpretation of the Rome Statute under the mandates of Articles 5, 6 and 7(g). It is also in accordance with Articles 25(e), 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute (UNGA, 1998).

⁷ This faction was the ZANU-PF faction supported by Grace Mugabe and her husband in the run up to the ZANU-PF congress in 2017. The opposing Lacoste faction which was in support of the Emmerson Mnangagwa. The latter delivered the *coup d’état* of November 2017 which ousted President Mugabe prior to the congress meeting.

⁸ ‘Command Agriculture’ is a Zimbabwean industrialisation project which was initially subsidised by government at US\$500 million. The project was due to provide inputs of “fertili[s]ers, herbicides, lime, diesel, pesticides, maize seed and wheat seed” to empower local farmers and revive the agricultural sector according to the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT, 2019:105). ZIMSTAT (2019:105) however reports that in the 2016/17 agricultural year, only “7.7 percent of households in Small Scale Commercial Farms received inputs...6.2 percent of the households in Old Resettlement Areas and 1.9 percent of the households and Communal Lands received inputs under the Command Agriculture programme”. This is compared to 8.8%, 8.2% and 3.2% of these land use sectors having applied respectively (ZIMSTAT, 2019:111).

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